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Policy makers and military strategists should understand how to effect regime change in 
an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. With this understanding, campaign and 
operational strategies can be more accurately formulated. This thesis uses four historical 
case studies where successful regime change was implemented through UW and draws 
conclusions about essential components that can be used for future planning. A UW 
planning framework was developed, which consists of planning considerations, lines of 
effort and insurgent imperatives for success. The planning considerations that must be 
understood are the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of the target regime, the level of 
insurgent influence and social ties to the population. The four critical lines of effort for 
planning and executing UW with the goal of regime change were identified as: 
psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistical 
support. These four lines of effort are effective at fostering the insurgent imperatives that 
are highly correlated with success: motivation and commitment, tangible support, 
flexibility and adaptability.  
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Policy makers and military strategists should understand how to effect regime change in 
an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. With this understanding, campaign and 
operational strategies can be more accurately formulated. This thesis uses four historical 
case studies where successful regime change was implemented through UW and draws 
conclusions about essential components that can be used for future planning. A UW 
planning framework was developed, which consists of planning considerations, lines of 
effort and insurgent imperatives for success. The planning considerations that must be 
understood are the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of the target regime, the level of 
insurgent influence and social ties to the population. The four critical lines of effort for 
planning and executing UW with the goal of regime change were identified as: 
psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistical 
support. These four lines of effort are effective at fostering the insurgent imperatives that 
are highly correlated with success: motivation and commitment, tangible support, 
flexibility and adaptability.  
The planning considerations of the target regime and insurgent influence are used 
to assess how the external sponsor can best enable the insurgents. A high degree of 
insurgent influence and connection to the population is ideal to grow the organization and 
effectively coordinate operations and strategy. A strong organizational capacity amongst 
the insurgents suggests that external support will be utilized effectively and reduce the 
amount of sponsor visibility. The level of target regime strength and control will help 
determine how the insurgents should focus their efforts and how to employ them. Having 
a thorough understanding of the target regime will help identify vulnerabilities and 
fissures within the regime that can be exacerbated to help attrite their control. 
The lines of effort are used to develop an operational strategy that grows the 
insurgency, increases legitimacy and disaggregates the target regime. Psychological, 
disruption, intelligence and logistics operations are the broad categories used to classify 
the types of methods that can be used. These four lines give a starting point for 
operational planning that includes utilizing methods such as: the media, propaganda, 
 xviii 
sabotage, subversion, strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and sanctuary to increase 
insurgent legitimacy and disaggregate the target regime. 
Finally, the external sponsor should be continually assessing and fostering an 
environment that includes the three imperatives identified as common for successful 
insurgencies: commitment and motivation, flexibility and adaptability, and tangible 
support. These attributes will ensure that the insurgency can continue to grow and remain 
relevant in the face of a much larger, more sophisticated force. By displaying these 
imperatives the insurgents will attract recruits, and keep the target regime reactive. 
Additionally, the insurgents will be able to rapidly exploit target regime mistakes or 
oppressive actions. 
These elements are all critical to the successful implementation of a regime-
change operation. When the four lines of effort are properly prioritized according to the 
insurgent or resistance groups’ strengths and weaknesses, the goal of regime change can 
be achieved. This thesis seeks to provide an operational planning framework for regime 
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The world has recently seen an increase in the number of revolutions attempting 
to bring about regime change through both violent and non-violent means. The Arab 
Spring beginning in 2010 saw regime changes in numerous Middle Eastern countries 
such as; Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In 2013, Thailand saw uprisings attempting to 
overthrow the regime in power and Ukraine saw their government toppled. In Syria, a 
violent insurgency has been ongoing since 2009.  Determining when and how to support 
a resistance or insurgency from outside requires an extensive understanding of the 
resistance, the target regime, the population and the external sponsor capabilities and 
limitations. External sponsors can often shift momentum in the insurgents favor, but what 
framework can sponsors use to best ensure success? This thesis will look at four 
historical unconventional warfare case studies that resulted in regime change and analyze 
the effectiveness of the proposed framework for planning an unconventional warfare 
campaign. 
A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
According to the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-05 published in 2012, the 
definition of unconventional warfare (UW) is “activities conducted to enable a resistance 
group or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with a underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”1 
The goal of a resistance element or insurgency ranges from effecting a policy change to 
overthrowing a government or occupying power. When sponsoring an insurgency, the 
external actor should ensure that their national goals coincide with those of the resistance, 
whether it is policy change, establishing an independent state or overthrow.  
The key component to UW is operating with or through an existing resistance 
element or insurgent. For this thesis a resistance element will be defined as a movement 
                                                 
1 Department of the Army, Special Operations (Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05) (Washington DC, 
Department of the Army, 2012), 9.  
 2 
that seeks to overthrow a puppet regime or occupying power and an insurgency will be 
defined as a movement that seeks to overthrow an established government that is organic. 
It is possible for an external sponsor to create the insurgency or resistance 
movement, however this takes time. By using an existing resistance organization, the 
external sponsor can focus on improving the insurgent capabilities. This study will focus 
on insurgencies and resistance elements that were externally sponsored by the U.S.  
Many studies have been conducted that outline the utility of using UW versus 
conventional warfare. Most often there is less risk and a significant reduction in cost by 
choosing UW. The nature of UW lends itself to smaller units, thus giving a smaller 
footprint in the host country and a smaller logistics tail. This approach supports the 
resistance or insurgency through training, supplies, advice and planning expertise. By 
allowing the resistance or insurgents to be the primary executors, the desired change 
often takes longer but can be more effective than a ground invasion by a foreign power. 
Conventional warfare may be more desirable when a resistance does not exist or does not 
have the capacity to win or when U.S. vital interests are at stake. That said: 
The decision to use unconventional warfare is dependent on a UW 
capability, influence on policy, and the impracticality of conventional 
warfare. UW capability is the summation of authority, organization, and 
mechanism. Influence on policy is a result of UW successes, continuation 
of inherited courses of action, and council from trusted advisor(s). The 
impracticality of conventional warfare can be a result of any number of 
causes.2 
Perhaps the most important aspect of determining when UW is the best alternative 
is identifying the capacity of the insurgent groups. Insurgent goals and U.S. policy must 
be fairly well aligned and the insurgent groups must have a significant chance of success. 
Success is determined by the insurgents’ ability to influence the population, their 
organizational capacity to unite disparate groups and their ability to counter the regimes 
efforts in a timely and effective manner. 
 
                                                 
2 Ryan Agee and Maurice Duclos, “Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for Unconventional 
Warfare” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 147.  
 3 
Once an external sponsor has agreed to support an insurgent or resistance 
element, military planning must occur to determine how to best enable the insurgent 
group. A framework for assessing insurgent viability and external support requirements 
can be useful. This thesis looks at a potential planning framework for UW campaigns 
with the goal of regime change.  
B. REGIME CHANGE 
The goal or objective of regime change may be conducted to seek a 
“realloca[tion] of power within the country,” or to “cause the withdrawal of an occupying 
power.”3 This can be accomplished violently or non-violently. The goal of the insurgents 
must be determined so that the external sponsor can effectively develop strategy.  
Regime change can be effected in various ways: forcefully through violent means, 
through the political process, non-violently through pressure or coercion or a 
combination. Whether it is an occupying power or illegitimate government, UW is only a 
useful tool to support the goal of regime change if a thorough understanding of the 
insurgency and target regime is known early. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What framework can military staffs use at the operational level to plan successful 
UW campaigns with the objective of regime change? This includes determining the 
operations that are most commonly used and the characteristics that correlate with 
insurgent success. By analyzing cases where the U.S. has succeeded in supporting 
insurgent goals, the answer to the secondary question of how this information can be 
applied to future UW campaigns can be answered. 
This thesis has two primary purposes: first to identify the elements that make 
regime change through a UW campaign successful and second, to demonstrate how the 
identified factors can be applied to UW campaigns. This thesis will provide the reader 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare Operations (FM 3-05-201) (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, 2003), 1–4.  
 4 
with a framework for how to assess potential insurgent organizations, the target regime 
and how an external sponsor can best support the goal of regime change.  
I identified three areas for organizing the planning framework: insurgent 
influence, target regime and lines of effort (LOE). The three areas are not meant to be all-
inclusive, but rather serve as a framework to begin planning external sponsorship of a 
UW campaign. All three areas contribute significantly to the imperatives identified for 
successful insurgencies: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and 
adaptability. The imperatives for successful insurgencies were obtained from a recent 
RAND counter insurgency study entitled Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern 
Insurgencies. The insurgent influence and target regime considerations were identified as 
important planning factors by numerous studies to include “How Insurgencies End” by 
RAND and current military doctrine. The LOEs were identified from current UW 
doctrine as well as declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents that 
detailed operational efforts that support the overthrow of a regime.  
D. IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES 
Recent RAND counter-insurgency (COIN) studies found that three imperatives 
characterized the COIN force during all effective COIN operations: commitment and 
motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability.4 Although the RAND 
publication is a COIN study and focuses on the necessary imperatives for the regime 
rather than the insurgents, it stands to reason that the same imperatives are relevant to the 
insurgency or resistance element and must exist in greater quality and quantity for 
insurgent success. Both COIN and UW are arguably population centric and require a 
level of passive and active support of the population to succeed. In this study, I will use 
the three imperatives mentioned above as assessment metrics that must be present for a 
successful insurgency with the goal of regime change. 
                                                 
4 Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunnigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons From 
Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 9. 
 5 
1. Tangible Support 
Tangible support includes manpower, funding, materiel, sanctuary, intelligence 
and tolerance to ensure growth and sustainment of the insurgency. 5 Ryan defines 
reducing insurgent tangible support as the center of gravity for the COIN force, which 
means that it must be secured by the insurgent force in order to be successful. “Although 
tangible support can come from a supporting population, it can also come from the 
external supporter.”6 Tangible support is perhaps the most important aspect of an 
insurgency because it keeps the group viable and enhances their ability to organize. 
Tangible support can come from anywhere, but popular support is still critical for 
ultimate success. Paul et al. also points out that “if insurgents are meeting their support 
needs from the population in the area of conflict, then tangible support and popular 
support would be largely the same thing.”7 The external sponsor must be careful not to 
provide more support than the insurgent organization has the capacity to handle and must 
also ensure that the level of support does not de-legitimize the insurgent organization. 
Outcomes for insurgencies can depend on whether the majority of tangible support comes 
from the population or the external sponsor.8 The population does not have to fight for 
the insurgency, but they cannot fight against it. Tangible support allows the insurgency or 
resistance element to continue to grow, which must occur to counter the state’s effort. 
2. Commitment and Motivation 
Commitment and motivation are necessary; without these imperatives the state 
can easily overwhelm the insurgents through a high operational tempo and constant 
harassing operations. Commitment must be a common characteristic as the state can 
                                                 
5 Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers (New York: Rand 
National Defense Research Institute, 2010). 
6 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxiv.  
7 Paul et al., Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 71. 
8 Ibid., 72. 
 6 
target non-committed individuals and degrade the insurgent intelligence advantage.9 
Committed individuals are more likely to resist the efforts of the state that can cause 
defections and internal rifts. Successfully and routinely conducting disruption operations 
can increase the morale of the organization thus increasing the commitment of the 
members. Additionally, exploiting regime repression can induce support for the 
movement and motivate members to continue to act despite the risks. Money and materiel 
resources can also increase morale as well as contribute to gaining more specialized 
recruits that can rapidly counter efforts of the state. If insurgent forces are not working in 
unity to effect regime change, but rather seeking to “maximiz[e] their personal wealth 
and power, bilking external supporters by extending the conflict or avoiding combat,”10 
then the insurgency will not be able to succeed. The syphoning of support from insurgent 
leaders shows a low level of commitment to the cause and higher level of commitment to 
personal wealth. Understanding the motivations of the insurgents prior to supporting 
them should be a critical planning consideration. Although selfish motivational factors 
are often hard to detect, continued growth within a resistance movement or insurgency 
and a lack of defectors can be used to display the groups’ level of commitment to the 
cause and their motivation to continue operations. 
3. Flexibility and Adaptability 
Being able to effectively and decisively counter the states’ efforts must be done to 
retain the initiative. The insurgency or resistance must be able to adapt to the conditions 
that the state imposes on them and the population. 11 This type of adaptation must happen 
at both the tactical and operational levels. Tactical innovation and adaptation is necessary 
to exacerbate social fissures among the populace while increasing the chance of 
                                                 
9 The primary advantage that an insurgency has over the state is the ability to remain anonymous and 
the ability to monitor the regime. This is referred to as the intelligence advantage because the state either 
lacks the ability to attain the same level of information on the insurgency or their ability is significantly 
lower than the resistance. The state will usually maintain the force advantage with a professional military 
and technological equipment so it is imperative that the insurgency exploit their intelligence advantage to 
the fullest extent possible. Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, Jan 15, 2013.  
10 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxiv. 
11 Ibid., xxv. 
 7 
government repressive actions. Some governments will use heavy-handed techniques 
such as declaring martial law or violently breaking up protests. The leadership and 
underground organization must be able to adapt to these changing conditions and exploit 
them to increase their popular support and momentum. This characteristic coincides with 
the ability of the insurgency to rapidly disseminate information and policies to the 
guerrilla or auxiliary forces as well as organize operations. If the target regime reacts to 
insurgent operations by offering compromise, the insurgents must be able to shift their 
strategy from violence or protests to negotiations. The advancement of the cause and 
achieving the insurgent goal should be the focus. The insurgents should be able to adapt 
to changing environmental conditions and keep their focus to be effective. 
E. LINES OF EFFORT 
Under the umbrella of UW campaigns, three specific resistance or insurgent goals 
were identified: policy change, secession and regime change. Often times, the same lines 
of effort are used to accomplish all three goals. During military planning, lines of effort 
must be drawn to determine the best way to achieve the goal. JP 5-0 defines a line of 
effort as “using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing 
operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.”12 In other 
words, identifying and prioritizing the methods used to establish the necessary conditions 
for success. This thesis identifies four common elements that were used in planning prior 
UW campaigns and will use these as the lines of effort for the case analyses. The UW 
objective for this thesis will be regime change. The lines of effort identified are: 
psychological warfare, logistical support, disruption operations and intelligence 
operations.13  
Effectively coordinating these lines of effort does not guarantee success. The 
sequence, priority and emphasis on each line of effort in addition to the target regimes 
                                                 
12 Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5-0) (Washington DC: Department of 
Defense, 2011), GL-12.  
13 These lines of effort were identified through historical accounts of UW efforts and primarily 
derived from various CIA and DOD documents pertaining to UW. All regime change operations identified 
used all or some combination of psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations 
and logistics support. 
 8 
vulnerability and the level of insurgent ability to influence the population are likely to 
determine the level of success. In Iran 1953, these lines of effort existed and the 
campaign for regime change was incredibly quick and decisive because the target regime 
was weak and the resistance element had a high ability to influence the population. 
Conversely, in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs operation, these lines of effort were used, but 
not optimally and the U.S. failed to overthrow Fidel Castro’s regime. The U.S., as an 
external sponsor in Cuba, failed to correctly assess the will of the population to act 
against the regime and failed to exploit regime fissures and vulnerabilities. This thesis 
will concentrate on how the lines of effort and the insurgents’ ability to influence the 
population were prioritized to achieve the goal of regime change. This thesis will also 
examine which LOE’s are more important for a violent campaign versus a non-violent 
campaign. 
As the U.S. seeks to utilize a “light footprint” to achieve policy goals, conducting 
UW operations more precisely with a higher certainty of success will save effort, money, 
lives and avoid political fallout for all involved. A planning framework for UW 
operations will serve as a starting point for campaign development for the purpose of 
regime change.  
1. Psychological Operations 
Psychological warfare is the use of propaganda, media and messages to influence 
a target audience. This is usually directed at the following groups: enemy, enemy 
sympathizers, uncommitted and resistance sympathizers.14 The goal of these operations is 
to incite dissatisfaction within the target regime, stimulate apathetic populations to side 
with the resistance and increase morale within resistance elements and supporters.15 
Psychological operations can be anything from radio messages that attempt to influence a 
susceptible population to underground newspapers, flyers, whisper campaigns and 
attempts to cause defection among the regimes elite. Properly executed military 
                                                 
14 Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare Operations, 1-1.  
15 Central Intelligence Agency, Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government 
(Washington DC: CIA, 1970).  
 9 
operations also have significant psychological impact. These operations seek to create 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and incite some level of internal disruption within the 
target state. 
2. Intelligence Operations 
Intelligence operations consist of three subgroups: psychological, tactical and 
strategic intelligence. The purpose of psychological intelligence is to monitor the target 
regime and the people with a focus on local sentiments or attitudes on a daily basis to 
inform timely operational planning. The purpose of tactical intelligence is to collect 
physical data on all sabotage targets; mainly low level, visible target data collection. The 
purpose of strategic intelligence is to gather information from high-level sources such as 
defectors or people within the target regime itself.16 Intelligence operations are necessary 
because they form the basis for action. The greatest advantage a resistance or insurgent 
group has is the ability to remain anonymous and potentially collect information on the 
target regime without alerting them to nefarious activity. This can be done overtly 
through the monitoring of troop movements or clandestinely through high level sources 
or assets within the regime. Additionally, these operations give the insurgent or resistance 
group the ability to plan tactical operations that give them a higher chance of success by 
targeting sympathetic individuals or lightly guarded targets. Maintaining security within 
the insurgency is also an important aspect of the intelligence LOE. This is linked to the 
existence of a sanctuary through tangible support and the ability of the insurgents to vet 
their members and consistently assess their vulnerabilities. 
3. Disruption Operations 
Disruption is defined in the ADP 3-05 as “degrad[ing] the effectiveness of 
adversaries and threats. This includes their support networks, shadow governments, 
infrastructure and financing, through unilateral surgical strike and special warfare in 
concert with Service or Army conventional, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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multinational partners.”17 Disruption involves the destruction of enemy infrastructure 
through sabotage and deception, focuses on diverting enemy attention away from critical 
vulnerabilities or areas and seeks to divide enemy forces through subversive actions. 
Disruption can induce fractures in the upper echelon of the target regime, thus creating 
more permissive political opportunities. It also creates a sense of cognitive liberation 
among the resistance or insurgency elements as well as the population. Sabotage 
operations are focused more on kinetic targeting of infrastructure and other physical 
targets. Subversion is another form of disruption and instead focuses on targeting 
individuals in an effort to create fissures within the regime. In this sense, inducing high-
ranking defectors from the target regime can be an effective disruption operation. 
4. Logistical Support 
Logistical support refers to the arms, ammunition, food, clothing and special 
equipment needed to properly outfit an insurgency or resistance element to enable a 
regime change campaign.18 The logistical support forms the basis of tangible support 
needed for an insurgency to succeed. Tangible support includes manpower, funding, 
materiel, sanctuary, intelligence and tolerance19 to ensure growth and sustainment of the 
insurgency. The logistics support that an external sponsor provides can greatly increase 
the likelihood of success for an insurgency or resistance movement. This support can be 
through advice, money or material but in all cases it seeks to motivate the group by 
properly outfitting them with what they need to succeed. It should also be noted that 
logistical support can be both internal and external to the operational environment 
depending on the permissiveness of the target environment. 
F. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
Operational art in the Army doctrinal publication 3-0 is defined as “the pursuit of 
strategic objectives in whole or in part through the arrangement of tactical actions in 
                                                 
17 Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, 12. 
18 Central Intelligence Agency, Power Moves involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly 
Government. 
19 Paul et al., Victory Has a Thousand Fathers. 
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time, space and purpose.”20 In short, operational art is the process that military planners 
use to accomplish their goals. In special operations, this process is starting to regain  
traction as a result of the 2012 publication of the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command Planners Handbook for Operational Design. Modifying the process to counter 
new and complex threats along with the incorporation of tools such as social media 
platforms is needed. Additional publications like Colonel (COL) Brian Petit’s “Going Big 
by Getting Small,” describes the application of operational art during phase zero or pre-
conflict stages.21 It is during this time that considerations and contacts for future UW 
should be developed. The two critical planning considerations that must be considered 
during the operational art process are the insurgent ability to influence and connect with 
the population and the target regime strength and vulnerabilities. 
Understanding the insurgent’s ability to influence the population and knowing 
target regime vulnerabilities are critical to the operational art process. These 
considerations should be continuously updated to provide decision makers with viable 
options in a timely manner. Trying to gain information on these aspects during later 
phases may be more difficult as the insurgent or resistance element will typically be 
operating more clandestinely and more willing to fabricate truths for support. 
Additionally, if an insurgency gains increased public support, it could be harder and more 
dangerous to operate within a given country, as security will be tighter. It is necessary to 
cultivate contacts and collect information as early as possible to formulate a successful 
plan for external sponsorship. 
1. Insurgent Influence  
The ability of the resistance element to influence and connect with the populace is 
a critical factor for success. This refers to the ability of the insurgency to effectively 
spread its narrative and messages and how well the resistance can “develop relationships  
 
                                                 
20 Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, 9. 
21 Brian Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero 
(Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013).  
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with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front 
organizations.”22 This trait can serve to insulate the insurgency from the state and also 
assist in recruitment and securing resources.23 
A homegrown insurgency is internally and organically able to keep the 
organization resourced and therefore able to retain and recruit new personnel. This is due 
to their familial and deep ties to the population. Organic surrogate forces can help reduce 
the sponsor’s visibility and exposure during regime-change campaigns. Organic surrogate 
forces already have a certain level of legitimacy and capability amongst the population. 
This capability allows the external sponsor to be less active in executing operations and 
play more of an organizational or coordination role. Reducing the sponsor’s visibility can 
prevent or weaken the target regime’s propaganda claiming that the resistance movement 
or insurgency is a form of foreign interventionism. With sufficient influence potential, a 
resistance movement is poised to win.  
Connable and Libicki refer to popularity stating, “When the insurgents or groups’ 
popularity was high, the insurgents lost only one-third of the time.”24 Popularity can be 
linked to being embedded within the population. In the twenty-first century, popularity 
may be visible in direct communications via numerous social media sites or cell phones.  
A homegrown insurgency is usually well poised to ensure that mechanisms are in 
place to communicate and disseminate messages. Additionally, leaders are known and 
unity between the different factions and sub-groups exist. An example of this is the 
Solidarity movement in Poland where many different trade unions and workers’ 
organizations were united under one umbrella organization that effectively 
communicated their plans and information throughout the organization. 
 
                                                 
22 Department of Defense, FM 3-05-201, 1-7. 
23 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National 
Defense Institute, 2010), 79. 
24 Ibid., 176. 
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This is a critical factor considering the level of external support needed to stand 
up an organization in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. Understanding 
the culture and unifying factors is necessary to determine how to influence the population 
and support the group that the external sponsor backs. 
2. Target Regime Strength 
The strength and type of target regime is also an important factor in determining 
whether or not the insurgency or resistance element will be successful.  The level of state 
control can have a significant effect of insurgent success. Governments that employ 
autocratic methods can crush insurgencies in the incipient stage.25 Additionally, 
governments that enact political reform can defeat the insurgency through a participatory 
democratic process.26 This thesis will assess the levels of government control using an 
existing RAND study27 to determine how the lines of effort and insurgent social 
networking ability affect regime control. 
The type and level of regime control will help determine which lines of effort will 
have the priority. In a police state with a high level of state control, overt disruption 
efforts may result in a disproportionate number of casualties for the resistance or 
insurgent movement. However, subtle propaganda messages may create fissures within 
the regime and create opportunities for insurgent or resistance elements. 
When planning external sponsorship for an insurgent or resistance element, 
planners must consider the level of regime control before determining the type of support. 
A standard template cannot be applied universally. Careful consideration of target regime 
capabilities, strengths and weaknesses is required. 
The lines of effort serve as a starting point for external support based on the 
insurgent networking ability and the vulnerability of the target regime. These elements  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 114. 
26 Ibid., 115. 
27 This thesis will utilize the existing RAND studies of How Insurgencies End by Connable and 
Libicki, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers and Paths to Victory by Paul et al. to assess how internal 
insurgent dynamics and target regime strength contributed to successful insurgencies.  
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can form the base that will enable the movement to exploit the imperatives for insurgent 
success: commitment and motivation, a tangible support base, and flexibility and 
adaptability.28  
G. HYPOTHESIS 
Successful UW campaign planning requires a complete understanding of the 
insurgent imperatives, UW planning considerations and how to properly integrate the 
four identified LOE’s. This thesis will focus on the operational level of war and the 
specific planning factors that should be considered during UW campaign design. The 
political objective sought will be regime change, the insurgent imperatives will be: 
commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability. UW 
considerations will be: insurgent influence, target regime oppression and vulnerabilities. 
The LOE’s for planning external support will be: psychological, intelligence, disruption 
and logistics. Understanding the aspects listed above and their relation to historical 
examples may be able to help guide future strategy for the military planner. 
H. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will examine regime change campaigns and how the insurgent 
imperatives, UW planning considerations and LOE’s contributed to their success. This 
thesis will examine four case studies where the U.S. sponsored insurgent or resistance 
groups for the purpose of regime change. 
The case studies selected are based on two criteria. First, the cases will encompass 
the widest range of violent and non-violent regime change campaigns as possible. 
Second, they will represent both insurgencies and resistance movements. This thesis will 
examine the following cases in detail: OSS operations in Burma during World War II, 
Solidarity movement in Poland during the Cold War, Contra insurgency in Nicaragua 
during the 1980s and the 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines.  
                                                 
28 Paul et al., Paths to Victory. 
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I. ROAD MAP 
Chapter II will describe the case study selection and rationale. Chapter III through 
VI are the case studies, which identify the UW planning considerations, LOE’s and how 
the insurgents fostered the imperatives needed for success. Each case study will also 
include an analysis that briefly summarizes the elements that contributed most 
significantly to the insurgents success. Chapter VII is the conclusion, which includes a 
summary of the common threads that were noted in all four case studies and how this 
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II. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The insurgencies identified for this study were conflicts that the U.S. sought to 
support throughout a variety of means. Table 1 depicts the cases that were identified for 
potential research.  
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29 Table legend: Question to identify effective disruption cases within the pool of U.S. sponsored 
unconventional warfare campaigns.  
Psychological operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
intelligence operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
Disruption operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
Logistics operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
Internal support for the insurgency is assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
Target regime control of the populace is assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U) 
Was regime change effected? Yes (Y) or No (N) 
30 R. W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New 
York: Norton and Company, 1954).  
31 John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II, 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Francis J. Kelly, U.S Army Special Forces 1961–1971 (CMH Pub 90-23) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973) 
36 Robert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How 
they Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
37 Prados, President’ Secret Wars. 
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B. TYPOLOGY 
The above cases were further separated using the following characteristics: 
resistance, insurgency, violent and non-violent. In this thesis resistance movements are 
movements that sought to overthrow a puppet regime or occupying power. An 
insurgency, on the other hand, is against an internal or organic adversary or government 
that is not under any external control or occupation. This is an important distinction 
because resistance organizations and insurgencies may use different methods to garner 
public support and also may use different techniques for leverage. For example, 
resistance organizations may use powerful nationalist narratives to mobilize support 
against a foreign occupier. Insurgencies may sway the population to fight against a 
government that they elected or supported by providing essential or basic services that 
the government does not.  
Violent and non-violent refers to the level of lethal activity directed at the target 
regime. Violent campaigns are armed insurgencies or resistance elements that use lethal 
force as the primary means of removing the regime from power. Non-violent campaigns 
may be armed, but primarily use social or international pressure as their means for 









Figure 1.  Cases separated according to the typology. 
The cases were then selected, one from each quadrant to cover as wide of a range 
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Figure 2.  Selected case studies according to the typology. 
DET 101 was selected as the violent, resistance case. Despite being one of the 
most successful disruption forces of the last century, DET 101 was able to organize a 
significant native force to support their lethal operations. They were also able to 
successfully exploit fissures between the occupying Japanese and the indigenous 
population of Burma through the use of a vast intelligence network. DET 101 was part of 
a much larger war effort, but their support to the Burmese resistance proved vital to the 
China-India-Burma theater success. The Solidarity movement in Poland during the 1980s 
was selected as the non-violent, resistance organization because of their significance at 
the end of the Cold War and their success in using traditional bases of power and existing 
organizations to build and coordinate the movements’ actions. Solidarity was able to 
garner international and local support through the extensive use of propaganda, symbols 
and non-violent demonstrations. Solidarity worked significantly with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to move its cause forward and assist the U.S. in gaining more 
insight to Soviet intentions. The case of Nicaragua and the Contras was chosen as the 
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through the use of violence. Additionally, the Contra case demonstrates the importance of 
insurgent unity and how external sponsor actions can have a significant effect on success. 
The Contra case demonstrates how having the flexibility to amend or revamp operational 
strategy is key. The 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines was chosen as the 
non-violent insurgency because it shows how political pressure can be exerted to enable 
the success of an insurgency. This case also shows how external support can be minimal 
when the insurgent force has significant organizational capacity and how co-opting 
certain pillars of support can greatly increase the insurgent movement’s effectiveness. 
U.S. contribution to the revolution was limited, but the U.S. did assist in removing the 
leadership during the final days, which resulted in success. 
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III. CASE STUDY 1: DETACHMENT 101 IN BURMA, 1942–1945 
The Burma case occurred during World War II and is an example of a successful 
violent resistance. The U.S. with the help of indigenous forces waged a UW campaign to 
expel the Japanese from Burmese territory and facilitate Allied operations throughout the 
region. To accomplish this, the U.S. and Burmese allies utilized a high level of disruption 
operations mainly focusing on sabotage while also using a high level of intelligence 
operations to facilitate their efforts. The U.S. was able to enable the success of the 
resistance with just over 200 people by properly exploiting the mistakes of the target 
regime and conducting well-coordinated and planned operations. The intelligence and 
disruption LOE’s were used significantly in this case and should be considered the 
priority LOE’s for a successful violent resistance UW campaign to expel an occupying 
power. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1937, Chiang Kai Shek, the leader of China and the Chinese Nationalist Party, 
had joined forces with the communist insurgency inside his country, led by Mao Tse-
Tung, to defeat a Japanese threat to their sovereignty. Japan had taken control of many 
key Chinese ports and was preventing resupply of the Chinese forces. This catalyst forced 
Chiang to build a road from Kunming, China, to Lashio, Burma, known as the Burma 
Road, for resupply via the port in Rangoon.39 The Burma Road became a vital logistics 
link for the Chinese from 1939 to 1941. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Japanese began their offensive against Burma, bombing the major cities and expanding 
their control of key areas.  
By March 1942, the Japanese controlled the Burma Road cutting off Chinese 
supplies. Two divisions of Chinese were already working with the U.S. under the 
command of Major General (MG) Joseph Stilwell. The U.S. re-enforced the Chinese  
 
                                                 
39 James R. Ward, “Detachment 101: Office of Strategic Services Burma—April 14, 1942 to July 12, 
1945, ‘The American Kachin Rangers’” accessed October 15, 2013, http://www.oss-101.com/history.html.  
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because they wanted to tie down the Japanese land forces throughout the theater. By 
May, Burma was firmly under Japanese control and MG Stilwell along with his Chinese 
divisions were forced north into India to re-group.40 
It was during this time that MG Stilwell received a proposal that offered to send 
him a detachment of men from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to help him with 
intelligence and sabotage missions inside Burma. Reluctantly, MG Stilwell accepted the 
detachment and Major (MAJ) Carl Eifler was named as the leader.41 In the summer of 
1942, MAJ Eifler and the detachment, known as DET 101, were given the mission by 
Stilwell to “establish a base camp in northeast India and from there, plan and conduct 
operations against the roads and railroads leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the 
Japanese the use of the Myitkyina airfield. Establish liason with the British authorities to 
effect coordination with their operations.”42 
The directive from MG Stilwell was not a UW mission; however, the DET 101 
leadership realized that in order to effectively deny the Japanese use of airfields they 
would need local support and more than 21 men.43 By utilizing indigenous forces and 
enabling the disaffected portions of the Burmese population to expel the Japanese 
occupiers, DET 101 executed MG Stilwell’s directive through UW. The force focused on 
guerrilla warfare operations and on establishing an effective intelligence apparatus and 
auxiliary. 
DET 101 utilized existing sources for recruitment such as Burmese refugees, 
Burmese sources within the British Army and contacts within the Kachin community to 
become the key disruption force within Burma.44  
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 William Donovan, the head of the OSS at the time, had to convince MG Stilwell to accept the 
proposal by allowing Stilwell to pick the leader. MG Stilwell subsequently picked one of his protégés, COL 
Carl Eifler. Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1996), 25–27. 
42 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101,” September 22, 
1993, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm. 
43 Ward, “Detachment 101.”  
44 Ibid. 
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From 1942 to 1945, DET 101 and its counter-parts were able to gather 75 percent 
of all intelligence acquired throughout the theater.45 In addition, it was able to divert and 
divide enemy forces through sabotage and subversion, rescue a significant number of 
allied airmen and raise a 10,000-man force to seize Burma from the Japanese.46 
Furthermore, the integration of the DET 101 operations into the conventional ground 
force operations allowed for a significant amount of precision air strikes and ground 
operations that enabled a rather small amount of men to overcome a stronger, well 
entrenched Japanese force.  
DET 101 understood the internal elements of both the target regime and 
indigenous forces and developed a plan that included all elements that have been 
proposed in the UW planning framework. Although a significant underground was not 
established, DET 101’s actions can be considered a case of operational UW used to expel 
an occupying power. DET 101’s UW efforts complimented an overall strategy that 
incorporated conventional and allied air operations. As a result, DET 101 was able to 
shape the China-India-Burma theater for an Allied victory. 
B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Target Regime  
Prior to and during World War II, the Burmese were accustomed to occupation. 
The British colonized Burma in 1824 as a result of the Anglo-Burmese war and were still 
in charge of the country prior to the Japanese occupation. Many of the Burmese believed 
that the Japanese invading force would allow greater autonomy and give the Burmese 
people the ability to govern themselves and thus supported the invasion. The Japanese 
had initially infiltrated Burma with 30 subversive agents in April of 1941 who provided 
information on British strongpoints and spread a damaging narrative throughout much of 
the country, particularly in the south. These personnel were known as the 30 comrades.47 
The 30 Comrades were part of the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) and sought to 
                                                 
45 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”  
46 Ward, “Detachment 101.” 
47 Ibid. 
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expel the British from the country. The BIA was able to effectively use race divisions to 
turn tribes and different ethnic sects of Burmese against one another and the British.48 
This led the southern half of Burma to be widely pro-Japanese during the invasion.  
The Burmese believed that the Japanese would allow more self-government and 
greater political autonomy than the British. Once the Japanese arrived however, the 
sentiment among the Burmese people changed as they learned that the Japanese had no 
intention of involving them in any politics. The Japanese and the BIA committed many 
crimes against the ethnic Burmese people and alienated them by disregarding their basic 
rights, such as putting whole communities under arrest.49 This led to conditions that were 
easy for DET 101 to exploit. As Paul et al. explain, COIN efforts focused on destroying 
threats that often involve atrocities.50 In the Burma case, these atrocities initially occurred 
against the northern Burmese, which alienated the population from the occupiers. As time 
went on, the Japanese alienated all Burmese, which pushed the Burmese people towards 
supporting the Allies. 
2. Insurgent Influence 
The ethnic Kachin tribes of Burma became a large source of Allied support. The 
Kachins lived in the mountainous regions of the north and were largely untouched by the 
Japanese during the initial days of occupation because of the difficulty of the terrain.51 
Initial recruitment efforts were focused on the Kachin tribal areas of Burma because it 
was close to India and much safer to infiltrate then other parts of the country.52 
DET 101 used the Kachin seclusion from the Japanese and the BIA atrocities as 
motivating factors to advance their efforts. Using ethnic Burmese and Chinese personnel, 
DET 101 infiltrated the northern area of Burma with members of the British “Burma 
                                                 
48 Andrew Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 3 
(1986): 483–507. 
49 Ibid., 490–491. 
50 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 180. 
51 Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” 493. 
52 Tom Moon, This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert Operations in 
World War II (Los Angeles, CA: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 110. 
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Rifles” and made contact with the Kachin people. DET 101 personnel quickly integrated 
into the Kachin society, learning the culture and participating in local customs.53 The 
Kachin territory in northern Burma became the foothold that DET 101 needed to begin 
their intelligence operations. By 1943, DET 101 had established six outposts within 
Burma and began aggressively training the indigenous personnel in sabotage techniques 
and disseminated intelligence requirements.54 According to the CIA, “By the end of the 
year it was possible to assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of Japanese strengths and 
dispositions in northern Burma.”55  
The ability of the resistance to interact with the population relied on the strong 
tribal and familial connections amongst their force. DET 101 only used ethnic personnel 
for intelligence operations and capitalized on the Chinese and Kachin familiarity with the 
terrain to execute reconnaissance and sabotage missions. DET 101 did not initially 
outline this design formally but rather figured it out in the early months through trial and 
error.56 The decision, whether purposeful or by accident, allowed DET 101 personnel to 
not be seen as another colonial power or invader and bolstered the resistance’s legitimacy 
and propaganda efforts.  
C. LINES OF EFFORT 
1. Disruption 
DET 101 personnel conducted an unprecedented number of successful disruption 
operations during the three years that they were active. Recorded DET 101 effects from 
1942–45 include: 57 bridges demolished, nine trains derailed, 272 vehicles captured or 
destroyed, 15,000 tons of supplies captured or destroyed, 78 Japanese captured and 
approximately 10,000 Japanese killed.57 As indicated by MG Stilwell’s initial mission 
statement to DET 101 personnel; “plan and conduct operations against the roads and 
                                                 
53 U.S. Army. “Ch-5: History of Special operations in the China-India-Burma Theater,” accessed 
October 17, 2013, http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-425.html ,108–109. 
54 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ward, “Detachment 101.”  
57 Ward, “Detachment 101.” 
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railroads leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the Japanese the use of the Myitkyina 
airfield.”58 Disruption was a key component of the DET 101 mission.  
Initially, the main targets selected for sabotage were the railways and roads. 
While the Kachins and guerrilla force was being trained, DET 101 used Chinese forces to 
execute the first disruption operations. These operations were against relatively low risk 
targets and were intended to build the detachment’s confidence.59 DET 101 used many 
tactics that were employed throughout the European theater as well, showing that the 
force was extremely flexible and adaptable in their approaches.60  
Once Kachin forces completed their training in India, DET 101’s guerrilla arm 
grew to 3,000 personnel.61 The Myitkyina campaign was a highlight of the disruption 
efforts executed by the Kachin guerrillas and DET 101 when the guerrillas directly 
coordinated with the Chinese forces to conduct disruption operations against the Japanese 
enabling the U.S. Army to secure an airfield and drive the Japanese out of Burma.62 
The successful disruption operations are directly linked to the integration of the 
guerrilla efforts with the Allied conventional force operations. Initial disruption efforts 
were focused on dividing the Japanese forces and delaying the logistics supplies from 
reaching the front lines. DET 101 focused on attacking railroads and supply convoys. 
One of their first operations was to destroy railroad bridges that crossed into central and 
southern Burma, which significantly slowed Japanese supplies into more populated areas 
of the country.63 These efforts showed that a formidable resistance element existed and it 
was sufficient enough to warrant Japanese attention.  
After Allied forces began more aggressively focusing on the Chinese-Burma-
India Theater, guerrilla efforts shifted from sabotage operations to providing direct 
support for conventional force operations. The guerrillas were used to push the Japanese 
                                                 
58 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.” 
59 Ibid. 
60 Moon, This Grim and Savage Game, 88. 
61 U.S. Army, “Ch-5: History of Special Operations,”105.  
62 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.” 
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out of the jungle areas to make them visible to the Allied air power and conventional 
forces.64 After DET 101 linked up with Merill’s Marauders in late 1943, they began 
integrating into a large ground offensive, which displayed the guerrilla force 
effectiveness.65  
The integration of guerrilla force operations with conventional force operations is 
the third stage of insurgent warfare, known as War of Movement.66 It is during this 
critical phase that the insurgents win the campaign or fail. DET 101 efforts to disrupt 
were focused on achieving large gains over time, and their ability to work so effectively 
with counterparts was critical to their success.  
The disruption line of effort became the second priority of the DET 101 campaign 
as it proved to the people that the Allied forces and native Burmese were willing to fight 
for the expulsion of Japanese forces and displayed this willingness through action. The 
actions were successful due to the integration with conventional forces and the accuracy 
of intelligence that was passed to them. The disruption effort assisted in building the 
commitment and motivation of the indigenous fighting force as successful operations 
kept the momentum on their side. Close coordination between the action oriented 
guerrillas and the intelligence cells proved to be effective in limiting the number of 
friendly casualties and ensuring that the smaller guerrilla force had the greatest advantage 
possible.  
2. Intelligence  
The DET 101 campaign against the occupying Japanese forces placed a 
significant emphasis on intelligence. Locations, morale, activities and plans of the 
Japanese forces guided the intelligence efforts throughout the theater. The intelligence 
networks that were emplaced were extremely effective at passing both tactical and 
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66 Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare Operations (FM 3-05-201) (Washington DC: 
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psychological intelligence to the allies for action against the Japanese forces. This led one 
of DET 101’s leaders and Eifler’s successor, W. R Peers, to say:  
For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mission. The 
Detachment did plan and carry out espionage operations specifically to 
collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a 
by-product of all its other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, 
and psychological measures. Its intelligence activities were therefore 
augmented rather than decreased when large-scale guerrilla operations 
were initiated in the spring of 1944.67 
Psychological intelligence was focused on knowing the sentiment of the people in 
the villages and the areas that the native Burmese agents were operating. MAJ Eifler used 
native Burmese agents “drawn from the Indian Army”68 to penetrate where DET 101 
personnel could not and gave them the mission to report on Japanese movements, local 
sentiments and anything they felt was of allied interest. These low-level collectors went 
through very rigorous training inside India and used their local knowledge to report 
information back to the outposts that were located throughout Burma and manned by 
DET 101. The native agents were able to provide the allied forces with the intelligence 
needed to strike where they could best exacerbate the fissures between the Japanese and 
the occupied Burmese.69  
The most significant collection garnered by the native agents was that of Japanese 
troop movements. This was demonstrated during the Hutkawng-Myitkyina campaign 
where DET 101 personnel and agents assisted Merrill’s Marauders in taking the 
Myitkyina airfield, which was vital to Japanese logistics. Native agents were inserted into 
the area weeks before the planned operation and effectively passed detailed troop 
movements, numbers and locations to the advancing conventional force. During the 
advance, the agents were able to guide the force through an unknown route to completely 
surprise the Japanese and seize the airfield.70 
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Another reason for this success was that the native personnel were exceedingly 
effective at gathering the intelligence that the allied forces needed because of their 
intimate knowledge of the culture, language and social norms that existed in Burma.71 In 
one of MAJ Eiflers first trips into Burma, he came upon a Naga tribe that wanted to work 
for the Americans and informed him that they frequently used women to pass 
information.72 The Japanese did not think of the women as any sort of credible threat and 
largely dismissed their movements and actions. After a payment arrangement was made 
between MAJ Eifler and the Naga, the women would pass information on local Japanese 
movements to the Naga men who would then seek guidance from DET 101 on what to 
do.73 Being able to train the native agents, gain their trust and effectively give them 
guidance enabled DET 101 personnel to gather an incredible amount of information to 
formulate and guide conventional actions in Burma that ultimately defeated the Japanese.  
The mission of acquiring tactical intelligence was given primarily to the Kachin 
forces of DET 101. These forces were used as the strike asset for the allies in Burma, thus 
it made sense that they should be the ones to reconnoiter their own targets. The Kachin 
efforts for gathering this intelligence were enabled by the psychological intelligence that 
was provided by the intelligence agents. The agents would recommend lightly guarded 
targets or targets that were extremely valuable to the Japanese. The Kachin force, with 
DET 101 personnel, would then be guided to the objectives by the agents and conduct 
their own reconnaissance. This gave each element a singular focus that helped make DET 
101 successful. As a result, the Kachin forces were able to conduct successful operations 
sustaining very few friendly casualties.74 
Kachin forces went through a significant amount of training to help them become 
adept at gathering tactical intelligence and executing sabotage operations.75 Eifler used 
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the training as a way to earn the Kachin respect by ensuring that the training was 
difficult, relevant and he reinforced the goal of expelling all Japanese forces. 
As the Kachin forces were accustomed to the unforgiving mountainous, jungle 
environment of north Burma, they were able to move through the jungles very swiftly 
and assisted the DET 101 personnel by teaching them basic jungle survival skills. These 
skills allowed DET 101 to accomplish their mission and evade capture by the Japanese on 
many occasions.76 Ultimately, the tactical intelligence mission was a good fit for the 
Kachin people, as they could not blend in with the local populace, like the native 
Burmese, but they were willing to fight against the Japanese and provide a sanctuary for 
DET 101. 
The intelligence mission for the OSS Burmese campaign was not directly geared 
toward any specific strategic place or target. It was extremely broad in scope and mostly 
enabled the allied conventional forces to drive the Japanese out of Burma. As stated 
previously, the intelligence efforts focused on “military information, such items as the 
strength, identity, and movement of Japanese units, details on supply installations, 
airfields, and equipment, and whatever else was required to provide a continuous, 
composite picture of the enemy situation.”77 The Japanese did not have many defectors 
that could provide the strategic intelligence that DET 101 required. Although, DET 101 
captured 78 enemy personnel, none were high ranking enough to be of strategic value.78 
The intelligence line of effort during the Burma campaign produced 75–85 percent of the 
intelligence that was garnered throughout the country.79 Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the intelligence line of effort in the Burma campaign was critical to its 
overall mission. This LOE was successful largely due to the sanctuary, manpower and 
knowledge that the Kachins provided. It not only enabled the Allies to counter Japanese 
efforts on the battlefield, but also gave a large amount of legitimacy to the external  
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sponsors. The British and American efforts were seen as complimentary to helping the 
Burmese take their country back. This resulted in a large amount of tangible support that 
was not effectively countered by the Japanese.80 
3. Logistics  
Establishing a logistics infrastructure inside India was necessary due to the 
extreme terrain and harsh conditions in Burma. This base provided a near sanctuary for 
the external sponsor to plan and coordinate operations. Initially, the base was established 
in Assam India, which was the location where the majority of Chinese and British forces 
had withdrawn during the final months of the Japanese invasion. After a couple of 
months, MAJ Eifler and MG Stilwell found it important to establish a logistics hub to 
receive supplies that was closer to the Burma theater and established an office inside 
Calcutta.81 Money was deposited into bank accounts for the American soldiers to 
withdraw as they moved back and forth from the camps in Kachin country to Calcutta for 
supplies.82 Additionally, Calcutta provided an airstrip that was able to receive Army 
supplies through formal channels. The supplies were then transferred to small planes and 
dropped at designated drop zones into north Burma for the guerrillas to recover.  
The method of delivering logistics supplies to the guerrilla forces and DET 101 
outstations was fairly standard. However, it was not easy to continue operations and keep 
morale high due to a small budget. The DET 101 leadership proved innovative by 
effectively providing their soldiers and guerrillas with the supplies they needed. One 
example of this ingenuity was the detachment’s ability to overcome the lack of radio 
communication between the outstation bases and the command headquarters in India. At 
the time, no radio existed that could transmit the 200 miles needed.83 Using the 
knowledge they had among the DET 101 personnel, they were able to develop their own 
radios that would transmit and receive over the 200 mile distance and mountainous 
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terrain of Burma. The equipment was built using aluminum from a crashed C-47 chassis 
and C-ration cans, but it proved effective and was portable enough for the infiltrating 
teams to carry.84 This ingenuity shows the ability of the DET 101 personnel to overcome 
obstacles and the commitment of the personnel to the accomplishment of the mission. 
Another important factor in gaining the logistics support needed was the 
commitment of the leadership to ensure that DET 101 was properly outfitted. The 
Detachment routinely had to wait three to six months for supplies through the Army 
supply system. During some periods the outstations tried unsuccessfully to live off the 
land.85The Burma theater was a low priority for theater support assets, but the leadership 
managed to “beg, borrow and steal” everything they needed for success in the early 
days.86 As the theater rose in priority during 1943, more supplies and support for things 
like communications equipment started coming into Calcutta more regularly.87  
The Kachin tribes were all but cut off from the rest of Burma, even though they 
were responsible for the bulk of disruption efforts and provided a sanctuary and support 
to the Allied forces. Ensuring that they had the necessary rations, equipment and supplies 
to conduct their missions was necessary for their effectiveness. Proper logistics 
operations are necessary for any sort of military operation, however, for an external 
sponsor, providing material support can show a high level of commitment to the 
resistance. 
4. Psychological 
DET 101 personnel did not use psychological operations and propaganda 
extensively, however, an aspect of messaging still existed. Communications throughout 
Burma was incredibly difficult due to the terrain and the control the Japanese forces had 
on the population in the urban areas. Leaflets were deployed throughout the theater in the 
form of Japanese currency notes and fake surrender notes. It is not clear the effect that 
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these messages had on the populace as Burmese discontent with Japanese forces was 
already formed once the leaflets began to be dropped. 
Currency notes were also dropped. They were designed to create a fissure 
between the Japanese and the Kachin people. The currency notes, pictured in Figure 3, 
indicate that the currency the Japanese are forcing the Burmese to use is worthless and 




Figure 3.  U.S. psychological operation product used in Burma 
Translation: The Japanese Military Government commanded their troops 
in Burma to keep the following directives secret. The Military 
Government is issuing currency notes for your [the Japanese] use in 
Burma. Spend as much as you like for food and other things, but don’t tell 
the (Kachin) people the secret of the money. 
The text at the right of the box is: 
Kachin! 
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The Japanese are making these valueless notes for your use. 
It is easy to get these notes but very hard to buy food or other things. 
Avoid these notes or you will be cheated!88 
The dissemination of these and other messages was accomplished through the 
various intelligence agents that were deployed throughout the country. As a result of 
these notes, the Kachin forces insisted that they be paid only in Opium, which was of far 
more valuable currency than the Japanese money notes.89 This was morally against most 
of the Americans’ viewpoints; however, they understood that culturally, the Kachins 
permitted the use of opium.90  
Psychological operations were incredibly hard to undertake because Burma 
consists of numerous different ethnic and tribal groups. It would have taken considerable 
manpower to begin psychological operations in every ethnic area. Additionally, the 
Detachment lacked the necessary equipment to effectively start a clandestine radio 
network or leaflet distribution operation. Instead, DET 101 decided to focus on the area 
where their support was the strongest and their personnel the safest, which was in the 
Kachin area.  
D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS 
By focusing on the four LOEs and considering internal resistance and target 
regime elements, DET 101 was able to shape the attributes that a resistance element 
needs to conduct a successful regime change operation. These attributes are: commitment 
and motivation, tangible support, flexibility and adaptability.91  
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1. Commitment and Motivation 
The intelligence agents increased commitment by creating more familial and 
strong friendship ties to the resistance. The agents were able to do this by delivering more 
recruits to DET 101 outstations. The indigenous personnel were then able to expand the 
intelligence operations south of Kachin controlled areas and provide the intelligence back 
to Allied air assets and conventional commanders. The growth of local agents increased 
dramatically from 1942–1944 when DET 101’s guerrilla force grew from 3,000 
personnel to 10,000.92 This growth shows that motivation to fight against the Burmese 
was high.  
The psychological line of effort assisted in recruiting and helped solidify the 
resistance narrative when the messages were backed by disruption and sabotage actions. 
These efforts were easy in the DET 101 case, because the population was already 
motivated through the alienation induced by the Japanese. Motivation through messaging 
was also difficult due to the difficult terrain and limited equipment available.  
The Kachin and Chinese base enabled DET 101 to ensure that the goal of 
expelling the Japanese was an ideological factor of the participants that coincided with 
the Allied Powers. The deep distrust of the Japanese allowed DET 101 to keep the 
guerrillas motivated towards expelling them. The British controlled the initial Kachin 
recruitment base, which they developed through a force that was designed to assist in 
internal Indian operations. However, the British transformed the group into a fighting 
force against the Japanese, which DET 101 later used for their operations.93 Recruiting an 
already established group or organization allowed the detachment to begin operations 
immediately and allowed them to merely adapt existing infrastructure rather than create it 
from scratch. 
DET 101 and the resistance provided 75–85 percent of the intelligence coming 
from the theater 94 By being socially embedded within the local tribes, the agents were 
                                                 
92 Ward, “Detachment 101.” 
93 Astor, The Jungle War, 130. 
94 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.” 
 38 
able to pass information on the Japanese troop movements, which then enabled coalition 
forces to counter Japanese efforts. The vast amount of intelligence gathered is a metric 
that demonstrates how committed the DET 101’s sources were despite the risks. This trait 
enabled the operations to be incredibly successful, thus minimizing the risk to the DET 
101 personnel and maximizing casualties for the Japanese.  
2. Flexibility and Adaptability 
The Japanese were able to take Burma very quickly because the population 
welcomed them under the promise that Japan would help Burma become independent 
from the British. However, Japan did not intend to fulfill this promise; treating the 
Burmese inhumanely, thus alienating them from the population.95 By ruling the Burmese 
with an iron fist, the Japanese concentrated on killing the insurgents rather than focusing 
on the insurgent support, which tends to lead to failed counter insurgent efforts.96 This 
gave the DET 101 personnel an opportunity to capitalize on the distrust and fissures the 
Japanese created. DET 101 showed flexibility and adaptability by capitalizing on the 
populations distrust of the Japanese and relied on their knowledgeable local agents to tell 
them how to best execute operations. 
The disruption line of effort showcases the flexibility and adaptability of DET 101 
and the guerrillas. The link between the disruption operations and the intelligence 
operations was well exploited, which greatly contributed to success. 
Once the agents reported favorable conditions, combat cells, including 
Americans, parachuted into the areas and established operating bases to 
recruit and train guerrilla bands and to undertake a series of hit-and-run 
attacks against Japanese installations and outposts.97 
                                                 
95 Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” 483–507. 
96 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 180. 
97 U.S. Army, “Ch-5: History of Special Operations,” 106. 
 39 
The success of the operations increased the men and reduced the “free rider” 
mentality.98  Personnel joined the cause to fight against injustice and expel the Japanese. 
While the Burmese people may have wanted the Japanese to leave their country, they 
needed a catalyst to spur action. The disruption efforts by the Kachin forces showed that 
the Allied efforts were real and convinced the population to provide not just passive 
support, but active support, which manifested itself in providing information to the 
Allies. 
DET 101 proved that they were able to rapidly innovate both tactically and 
operationally as conditions changed. This was evident in the Myitkina campaign when 
the guerrillas facilitated the actions of Merills Marauders and shifted from the main effort 
to a supporting effort. Innovation was evident in the communication and logistics 
planning ultimately producing more autonomy in supply requisition and communication 
as a result of geographic isolation. 
3. Tangible Support  
According to Connable and Libicki, “Insurgent sanctuary correlates with 
insurgent victory.”99 Although, not noted as one of the imperatives for insurgent success, 
the value of the sanctuary, as tangible support, that the Kachin provided and how it 
enabled the effective coordination of intelligence, disruption, logistics and psychological 
operations cannot be overstated. The sanctuary allowed the movement of recruits, 
weapons, supplies, intelligence and funding to expand the resistance and keep morale 
high.100 The support base and sanctuary that the Kachins provided was key because it 
was ready immediately, which prevented the Japanese from gaining a tactical advantage 
against the tribes in the north. 
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The logistics line of effort enabled the tangible support for DET 101’s operations 
to continue thereby allowing operations to continue. Establishing a logistics base and 
distribution plan ahead of operations proved necessary in Burma due to the difficulty of 
the terrain and the non-permissive environment. The base in India provided a safe and 
accessible location for coordination and planning. Logistics operations also helped 
develop a surrogate/sponsor co-dependency with the Kachin tribesmen providing 
necessary knowledge of jungle survival and DET 101 providing necessary equipment and 
goods. 
E. ANALYSIS 
DET 101 used both target regime vulnerabilities and insurgent strengths to 
develop their lines of effort in the Burma campaign. The effective use of disruption, 
intelligence, logistics and psychological operations all assisted in fostering the 
imperatives for a successful UW campaign. The use of existing organizations, relying on 
insurgent knowledge for targeting and providing material support contributed to a high 
degree of commitment and motivation. The ability to shift from the main effort to a 
supporting effort during the Myitkyina campaign showed the flexibility and adaptability 
of the force. Gaining materiel support through standard and non-standard means and 
developing a strong auxiliary among the populace gave DET 101 the tangible support 
needed. 
As a violent resistance movement, DET 101’s operations were mainly focused on 
sabotage, but they ensured that the effect on the populace was minimal. This gave the 
resistance legitimacy and gave the population an avenue for action against the Japanese. 
Most of the population may not have picked up arms, but they provided passive support 
through the passing of intelligence and by not supporting the target regime. 
By exploiting fractures that the regime created, DET 101 was able to appeal to a 
wide swath of the Burmese population. The detachment started out in the north, but was 
quickly able to expand south throughout the country. It grew from less than 50 
Americans to a force of over 10,000 indigenous personnel in a three-year period.101 They 
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were able to accomplish this by respecting and adapting to the culture that they were 
operating in. Additionally, the detachment did not solely focus on the growth of its 
guerrilla forces, but also put a significant amount of time into developing the auxiliary. 
This helped them become effective at gaining the tangible support necessary to gain a 
significant intelligence advantage over the Japanese. 
Securing a sanctuary inside India and Burma, gave the detachment a safe place to 
plan and re-group after operations. This allowed them to plan and prepare more 
effectively.  
DET 101 operations tied up a large number of Japanese forces and kept them 
away from the other Pacific fronts. Additionally, they enabled the allies to expel a well-
entrenched, large Japanese force with limited resources. Through the development of a 
small auxiliary and focusing on intelligence, a well-trained guerrilla force led by DET 
101 was able to create the conditions for the resistance to succeed. 
The proposed planning framework is validated by this case of successful violent 
resistance. Although not all encompassing, it provides the planner with a base to start 
UW campaign planning.  
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IV. CASE STUDY II: SOLIDARITY IN POLAND, 1980–1989 
The case of Solidarity in Poland is a non-violent resistance against a Soviet Union 
backed puppet government. The resistance began with the formation of trade unions to 
rally for increased workers’ rights and wages. Going by the name Solidarity, the 
resistance became powerful from 1980–1990 and is believed to have significantly helped 
to dissolve the Soviet Union in 1990. The resistance was backed by the U.S., the Vatican 
and Israel, which provided significant intelligence and funds to help gain popular support 
and counter regime actions. Restrictions in Poland were significant after martial law was 
declared in 1981, so the resistance had to develop sophisticated mechanisms to keep 
active and receive the external support that was offered. Additionally, Solidarity had to 
shift tactics from public protest to propaganda as the target regime continued to increase 
pressure. The organization took nearly ten years from 1971–1980 to build the capacity 
needed to effectively manage the thousands of supporters and numerous organizations 
that it entailed. Solidarity is widely considered one of the most successful non-violent 
resistance movements against a powerful and sometimes ruthless target regime. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
In the port city of Gdansk, Poland in 1970, hundreds of workers gathered to 
protest the communist governments cost increases for food. As part of the Warsaw Pact, 
Poland was under heavy communist control and influence from not only the Soviet 
Union, but also surrounding countries in Eastern Europe. The government was increasing 
the cost of basic necessities and the food supply to remain solvent. As the leader of 
Poland, Wladysaw Gomulka, was frightened that the riots in Gdansk would lead to all out 
unrest within the country. As a result, he ordered the police to fire on the crowds of 




and over one thousand were wounded.102 This event is considered the spark that started 
the fall of communism in Poland and was the catalyst that begun the Solidarity 
movement. 
After the riots were over in 1970, the workers unions began organizing 
clandestinely underground in order to form an alliance that could protect their rights. By 
1976, the unions were getting strong and at the same time the regime decided again to 
raise the food prices as it did in 1970. Again riots ensued and the regime relented by 
lowering the cost of food. Discontent continued to increase throughout the 1970s and the 
workers unions continued to mobilize, but the regime managed to keep them sufficiently 
suppressed until 1980.  
A series of events led the small workers movement to expand well beyond the 
thousands to millions of supporters. In 1980, Solidarity was officially adopted as the 
name for the workers unions, turned resistance element. The regime censored the 
populace and detained over 6,000 union members, killing nine and officially banning the 
Solidarity movement.103 This continued until 1984 when Mikhail Gorbachev took power 
in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev brought a more moderate government to the Soviet 
Union, which created an opening for the Solidarity movement to exploit, as the Kremlin 
was more reluctant to support Poland’s’ coercive political control. Ultimately, 
communism fell in 1989 and Solidarity’s success as a resistance movement led to a free 
election that saw their leader, Lech Walesa, elected as the democratic leader of Poland. 
Solidarity formed an extensive underground base and auxiliary before emerging 
as an overt resistance organization. The Solidarity case is worth examining because it was 
conducted without the use of a guerrilla force and utilized largely non-violent tactics to 
overthrow the target regime through the political process. It took Solidarity 10 years to 
affect this change once it emerged as a recognized group in 1980. By examining the  
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operational efforts of the group and the internal dynamics of Poland at the time, this case 
will illustrate how their efforts generated the attributes of commitment, motivation, 
flexibility, adaptability and tangible support to succeed.  
B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Target Regime  
Poland was partitioned during the eighteenth century and suffered through many 
uprisings in an effort to gain independence. Finally, by the end of World War I, Poland 
was an independent nation.104 The uprisings and struggle of the Polish people left an 
indelible impression and romanticized resistance against greater powers. It also left a 
strong sense of nationalism within the people and a desire to live in a sovereign nation.  
World War II brought in a new era of oppression with the invasion by German 
forces. It is estimated that over six million Poles were killed from1939–1945.105 In 1941, 
the Germans broke the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and took complete 
control of Poland.106 The Polish people despised the Nazi government and actually had 
pro-communist views. However, after the liberation of Poland in 1945 by the Soviet 
Union, it was clear that the elections were being rigged and by 1947, Poland had become 
a puppet state of the Soviet Union.107 
Despite an affinity for communism, the Polish people were upset by Soviet 
control of their country. When Stalin died in 1953, Wladyislaw Gomulka emerged as a 
leader in Poland. Gomulka was imprisoned under Stalin for his “nationalistic 
deviations”108 and upon his release, protests began to occur for fair wages and lower 
taxes. This led the Soviet apparatus to bring Gomulka into the government in order to 
quell the uprisings, and, in 1956, Gomulka was named first party secretary.  
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The Poles romanticized the type of resistance and nationalistic viewpoints that 
gave Gomulka initial success. However, most Polish people felt that the Soviet Union 
was using the country to further their own interest with complete disregard for the interest 
of Poles.109 This was at the forefront, especially within military circles, when the Soviet 
Union directed the Poles to focus only on NATO attack plans versus defense of their own 
country.110 Military personnel and Polish bureaucrats began to see that the Soviet Union 
was using them for nothing more than the defense of the Soviet Union and considered the 
Poles expendable. The Poles had a strong tradition of both resistance and nationalism, 
which were fueled by the revelation that the Soviet Union was using them.111  
In 1970, the Gdansk riots occurred after the regime raised the price of food and 
other basic necessities. The workers rioted and 45 people were killed. This marked the 
first violent reaction by the target regime against the Polish workers. Numerous protests 
erupted after the regime’s heavy-handed tactics and as a concession, the people were 
allowed to erect a monument honoring the victim’s sacrifices. Gomulka was removed 
from power and Edward Gierek was installed as the new leader. In 1976, the regime 
raised food prices, once again leading to riots and protests, which were crushed by jailing 
over 40 people and sentencing them harshly. The 1976 protests marked the second time 
that the communist regime reacted harshly against the workers and trade unions. 
In 1980, the regime once again acted harshly to protests for more workers rights, 
but due to the economic condition of the country, the regime could not continue to have 
another workers strike and after 18 days relented to the protestors’ demands. This did not 
last long however and from 1981–1984, the regime declared martial law and began 
censoring all protests and media and violated human rights within the country. 
Additionally, it banned the newly formed coalition of workers unions named Solidarity.  
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The regime vowed to jail all members of the organization and outlawed its existence. 
This led to a high level of international scrutiny and further isolated the regime from the 
people. 
The target regime allowed poor economic conditions to overcome the vast 
majority of Polish people during the 1970s and 80s. The regimes solution was to impose 
further costs on the people and unions, which resulted in protests and strikes. The regime 
then overreacted by imposing excessive jail sentences, injuring and killing people. This 
led many of the people to support regime change and call for reforms within the Soviet 
bloc. 
2. Insurgent Influence  
In Poland, 88 percent of the people identify themselves as Catholic.112 This is 
inconsistent with the tenets of communism, which is very much atheist. The Polish 
people have continued to strongly identify with the Catholic Church since the tenth 
century. The Soviets attempted to influence the population and minimize this 
relationship, however it was unsuccessful. Many of the workers that formed the 
Solidarity movement found their identity within the Catholic Church.113  
This was most evident in 1978 when Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow Poland 
was named Pope John Paul II. It was clear during this period that the Soviet Union would 
have to allow the Pope to visit Poland to address to the Catholic community. The Soviets 
attempted to undermine the attendance at the Pope’s speech by minimal advertisement, 
however, over two million people still attended.114 
The Pope spread a message that Poland was not a communist state, but rather a 
“free country saddled by communists.”115 In his speech, Pope John Paul II talked about 
the struggle of the Polish people and the victimization of its citizens at the hands of 
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oppressors. He emphasized the value of faith and the need to continue the struggle for 
their national identity. The Pope also spoke for the victims of many of the Soviet  
crackdowns during the 1970s particularly the Gdansk incident. 
We are before the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In the ancient and 
contemporary history of Poland this tomb has a special basis, a special 
reason for its existence. In how many places in our native land has that 
soldier fallen! In how many places in Europe and the world has he cried 
with his death that there can be no just Europe without the independence 
of Poland marked on its map! On how many battlefields has that soldier 
given witness to the rights of man, indelibly inscribed in the inviolable 
rights of the people, by falling for “our free-dom and yours”! “Where are 
their tombs, O Po-land? Where are they not! You know better than 
anyone—and God knows it in heaven116 
During his speech, the Pope never directly referred to the Solidarity movement. 
However, the unification of the people and the ability of the church to spread the message 
of resistance were vital to Solidarity’s success. The ability of Solidarity to capitalize on 
the religious fervor that Pope John Paul II brought to Poland was a critical aspect in how 
the resistance was able to network and grow as an organization. The church “provided a 
new cultural foundation of a new self-identification and the organizational experience for 
mobilizing it.”117 
Additionally, after the riots in Gdansk in 1970, it was the workers unions that 
were credited with pushing the Soviet backed Polish government to concede by lowering 
the cost of basic supplies. The workers unions used this popularity to build more support. 
Eventually, by the mid-70s, workers unions throughout the country had a strong base of 
support. It was the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) that emerged as the 
organizer to bring these unions together and begin creating an underground network that 
would monitor regime actions.118 
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KOR sought to increase awareness among the working class of activities 
conducted by the regime that were against their interests. KOR also sought to “provide 
the workers with an integrated ideology, both socialist and democratic, that was crucial 
later on in the development of the workers own representative organizations.”119 One of 
the leaders that emerged in 1980 was Lech Walesa. Walesa would go on to serve as a 
powerful symbol for Polish independence and a representative of Polish nationalistic 
values.120  
The bases of the Church and the trade unions created a strong organizational 
capacity for the resistance to flourish. Both allowed the leadership to quickly mobilize, 
inform and recruit for anti-regime efforts and resistance support. 
C. LINES OF EFFORT  
1. Disruption 
The one thing that Solidarity did very well was exploiting the mistakes and 
mistrust that the regime fomented throughout the 1980s. The primary disruptive acts that 
Solidarity used were strikes and protests, to accomplish this. The disruption effort of 
Solidarity is the second most important LOE as the various protests and strikes 
demonstrated a resolve on behalf of the people of Poland as the regime was failing 
economically. This effort contributed to the motivation of the resistance, displayed their 
commitment and helped increase both external and internal tangible support.  
Solidarity routinely used strikes, protests, the erecting of monuments and 
placement of symbols to openly defy and disrupt the regime. This was accomplished 
through ““the demonstration of courage of those who oppose authoritarian regimes.”121 
The cross has already been mentioned as a powerful symbol that defied the regimes anti-
religious views along with several bulletins that had the picture of President Ronald 
Reagan, which openly symbolized the desire for democracy within the nation. Placing 
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these various forms of propaganda throughout the cities and on prominent government 
structures assisted in subverting the regimes authority over the people. The success of 
Solidarity to gain mass support through these non-violent tactics and propaganda resulted 
in regime accommodations, or acts conducted by the regime that attempted to reduce 
social tension.122  
These acts gave the resistance element an opportunity to capitalize on regime 
failures and unkept promises. These protests, which were often followed by 
accommodations, disrupted the leaders of the regime by continually calling on them to 
prove their legitimacy and change their method of rule. The regime in Poland became 
used to granting accommodations to appease the populace. Their first concession 
occurred in 1956, when they installed Gomulka as their leader due to the social unrest 
that flowed his imprisonment. This was a concession to reduce the social tension in 
Poland and give the perception that the Polish people would be well represented. 
However, Gomulka was carefully handled by the Soviet Union and ultimately fell under 
their control as evidenced by his policies during the 1970 Gdansk riot that got him 
removed. Gierek followed him, which was viewed as another accommodation to give the 
people proper representation.  
The reduction of food prices and the approval to erect a monument for the fallen 
workers killed during the riots in 1970 was another accommodation that resulted from the 
disruptive strikes and protests. These accommodations empowered the people of Poland 
by proving that their resistance efforts could work to effect change. The people felt that 
the regime was punishing those that it purported to serve.123 Solidarity capitalized on this 
by recruiting new members into the workers unions under the banner of being the 
defenders of the Polish people. The monument was used many times in the 1970s as a 
place to strike and show disaffection towards the regime. The 1970 accommodation 
resulted in the formation of Solidarity. 
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Furthermore, 1970 was also significant for the formation of the resistance because 
it gave the population insight into how brutal the regime could be. With over 40 people 
dead and more than 1,000 wounded during the strikes, the people saw that the regime 
truly did not care for their well-being. This gave the resistance a powerful tool for 
recruitment and enabled them to exploit the target regime’s actions. The resistance 
understood that non-violent protests would often be suppressed using violence and they 
were able to disrupt the regime by using pictures and narratives of the victims. 
In 1976, when the regime attempted to enact the same laws as 1970, the unions 
were organized and able to remind the Polish people of the promises that were made in 
1970 and once again strike. These strikes took place in shipyards and involved over 
150,000 people.124 The strikes resulted in more heavy-handed tactics by the regime. The 
regime used force and arrests to dismantle the protests and injured many people. This 
undermined the effectiveness and trust of the regime even more. 
In 1980, after the regime had attempted to enact price increases and strict control 
over the population for the third time, they were significantly undermined by their own 
actions. Solidarity capitalized on this opportunity by making 21 demands that included 
the recognition of the trade union that resulted in the official creation of Solidarity, raise 
in workers’ wages, a day of rest, paid maternity leave and the right to strike.125 The 
measures were accepted by the regime, but were short lived after the declaration of 
martial law in 1981.  
Solidarity made the demands instead of continuing to strike, which would have 
negatively affected the Polish government even more. Not accepting the demands would 
have led to the Polish economy being completely bankrupt and might have accelerated 
the fall of the regime. These reasons compelled the regime to accept the conditions, but 
led to further mistrust once martial law was declared. This resulted in more support for 
Solidarity and a loss of support for the regime. The ability of the resistance to coerce the 
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regime into making these concessions was a significant shift in power for Solidarity and 
the people of Poland. Using the failing economic conditions as leverage led to the 
temporary concessions and gave Solidarity the ability to undermine the regime. 
In the case of Solidarity, the strikes and protests from 1970–1980 were successful 
disruption operations that resulted in temporary accommodations. From 1981–1990, 
Solidarity was forced to shift from strikes and protests to propaganda and reliance on 
international pressure. The dissemination of propaganda signs and narratives kept 
pressure on the regime to crush the resistance.  
The success of Solidarity’s actions was not seen until 1990. Instead of pushing 
immediately for a regime change during the 1980 riots, Solidarity continued to resist 
throughout the period of martial law and beyond, continuing to arrest power from the 
regime and take advantage of a unpopular regime. The opportunity finally came after the 
collapse of communism in 1989 when Solidarity became the leading political party. In 
1990, Lech Walesa was elected the president of the newly freed Poland and oversaw the 
country’s transformation to democracy.  
2. Intelligence 
Throughout the Cold War, it was incredibly difficult for the CIA to establish 
intelligence networks in highly controlled countries such as Poland. The need for a high 
level, strategic asset was high throughout the period. In 1972, the CIA received a letter 
from such an asset, COL Ryszard Kuklinski. Kuklinski was tired of the Soviet’s 
oppressive rule and contradictory policies in Poland and wanted to work with the U.S. to 
free Poland.126 COL Kuklinski was a high ranking Polish Army officer who was serving 
on the General Staff in charge of Poland’s defense and attack plans against NATO. From 
1972 to 1981, Kuklinski provided over 40,000 pages of documents detailing locations of 
command and control bunkers and the Soviet plans for all stages of nuclear war.127  
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Although Kuklinski was a valuable asset, he was forced to defect in 1981 after the 
Soviets received an indication that a mole existed after Kuklinski passed the Soviet plans 
for martial law.  
The departure of Kuklinski created an intelligence vacuum in Poland at a time 
when information was at a premium. The CIA wanted desperately to assist the Solidarity 
movement during the period of martial law because they felt that “A free, noncommunist 
Poland [they were convinced], would be a dagger to the heart of the Soviet empire; and if 
Poland became democratic, other East European states would follow.”128 Since the CIA 
lacked the in-country intelligence infrastructure, they sought an alliance with the Vatican. 
Through the Vatican assets and Catholic Church infrastructure in Poland, the CIA 
was able to get the tactical and political intelligence that they needed to provide analysis 
and advice to the Solidarity underground. The church was instrumental in reassuring the 
Solidarity leaders and underground that support existed internationally and they 
encouraged them to continue to resist.129 According to Bernstein, “The first objective 
was to keep Solidarity alive by supplying money, communications and equipment.”130  
The CIA and the Vatican worked very closely to coordinate their efforts. It was 
clear that the CIA needed the infrastructure that the Church provided to facilitate their 
efforts and the Vatican needed the CIA’s expertise. 
In the first hours of the crisis, Reagan ordered that the Pope receive as 
quickly as possible relevant American intelligence, including information 
from a Polish Deputy Minister of Defense who was secretly reporting to 
the CIA. Washington also handed over to the Vatican reports and analysis 
from Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior member of the Polish general 
staff, who was a CIA informant until November 1981.131 
In addition to the Vatican, the CIA also sought to leverage the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), which is a U.S. umbrella 
organization that oversees labor unions. The AFL-CIO was present in Poland at the time 
                                                 





to help better organize the number of Unions that were popping up as a result of the 1970 
and 1976 riots. The AFL-CIO provided an outlet for the CIA to gather and disseminate 
information throughout the country.132 
The intelligence network and external support from both the Vatican and the CIA 
was the most significant for Solidarity during the period of 1981–1989. The advice and 
information that these organizations were able to provide to Solidarity assisted in keeping 
them motivated and committed. By knowing that they had external and international 
backing, Solidarity was able to increase their tangible support base as well as diminish 
the government’s.  
3. Logistics 
The U.S. had a strategic interest in the success of Solidarity in Poland. Once 
Solidarity was recognized in 1980, the CIA saw an opportunity to assist the resistance 
group in challenging the authority of the Soviet Union in the region. In 1981, CIA 
Director William Casey sought approval to provide covert support to the group. Due to 
the institution of martial law and the banning of Solidarity during this time it was 
incredibly difficult to provide the needed support. The government had a significant 
amount of control over what came into and out of Poland and the security apparatus was 
watching the population. During the martial law period it was also incredibly hard to 
mobilize for any sort of disruptive acts, so Solidarity focused their effort on propaganda.  
The CIA wanted to help the group and decided the best way to do so was 
financially and through communication supplies to help boost Solidarity’s propaganda 
efforts. From 1982–1989, the CIA provided over six million dollars to the group along 
with printers, copiers and fax machines to help with the production of leaflets and 
underground newspaper.133  
Since the government had tight control of the sea ports in Poland, the CIA had to 
use an Israeli asset to take the supplies off of the inspection sheets at the ports of entry 
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customs checkpoints. The materials were then shipped to various members of the 
underground for use.134 The CIA also used the Catholic Church, by funneling money 
through the Vatican into Poland and then to the underground. These mechanisms limited 
the amount of support that the CIA could provide, but proved to be adequate during the 
intense period of martial law in the country.  
Solidarity continued to use the Church and the labor unions as means of financial 
support as well. However, financially, the people of Poland were not in a position to 
support the group extensively. During the period of martial law the estimated Solidarity 
budget was around eight million dollars, only two million were provided internally.135 
The external sponsorship by the CIA and their ability to provide logistics and 
financial support to the group was significant. However, its real value was amplified by 
the success Solidarity’s networks. Solidarity had a well-established organization that was 
able to continue their activities even under martial law. The external support resulted in 
an increase in the intensity and amount of propaganda activity but did little to assist in 
recruitment and growing the resistance movement.   
4. Psychological 
Solidarity’s psychological campaign was used to disaggregate the regime support 
and build their tangible support. The psychological effort by the resistance is the most 
important LOE, because it provided the resistance a substantial support base, a 
mechanism for mobilizing and for increasing external support, thus creating pressure on 
and disaggregating the target regime. Due to the target regime’s high control of media 
outlets and intra-state activities, the propaganda campaign focused on informing through 
the existing networks of the Church and trade unions as well as publicly conveying 
information through the use of flyers and underground newspapers. Utilizing broad 
frames such as self-determination, religion and human rights, the narratives were able to  
 
 




target friendly, enemy and neutral audiences in an effort to gain support. Solidarity used 
three main aspects of psychological operations to motivate and recruit new members: the 
narrative, media and leadership. 
Solidarity was focused on removing all Soviet influence from the government of 
Poland. Although, Gomulka was removed after the 1970 Gdansk incident as a measure to 
quell any uprisings and the more moderate Gierek was put into power, Gierek was still 
very much under the control of the Soviets. The Soviets tried to appease the Poles 
through merely symbolic changes of power, but by the 1980s, these measures were seen 
for what they were: an effort by the Soviets to have the Poles perceive change, when 
change was not at hand. 
The Solidarity narrative sought to appeal to a mass audience rather than seeking 
to pinpoint individuals. The resistance narrative would mention independence from 
oppression, self-governance and cooperation with other countries, which was enough to 
appeal to the mass of Poles who were outraged by both the economic and military 
oppression of the time.  
Motivational aspects of narrative were used to spark action among a population 
that was fearful of Soviet measures. Solidarity focused on nationalistic duty and 
attempted to invoke a sense of valor among the people. Part of their narrative stated the 
“duty to continue the work of those who preceded us and to avoid their mistakes and 
weaknesses.”136 This was a tribute to the resistance elements during the Nazi regime and 
to the Polish Left who made the mistake of accepting the Soviets as liberators. The 
narrative then mentions the heroics of the underground and resistance against the Soviets 
during the Gdansk riots of 1970 and other workers riots during 1976.  
The narrative effectively invokes that resistance against the Soviet regime is not 
only possible, but is working. Solidarity had the good fortune of starting out as a workers 
union and was able to morph into a resistance element with a base of support. The actions 
of the base during the 1970s provided for good motivation to further expand recruitment, 
which in turn increased the tangible support base. The fact that the union was able to get 
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the food prices reduced after the Gdansk riots and a monument erected to the workers 
who lost their lives was a victory for Solidarity that made them viable. 
Solidarity utilized a significant amount of media forms to portray its message; 
however, the two that were the most important were the newspaper and television. 
Walesa’s first national message came during the negotiations between the protestors and 
the regime in 1980. Walesa had only two demands that he sought; the first was “cast-iron 
guarantees never to repeat the mistakes and repressive policies of the past.”137 By this 
statement he was referring to the killing and crackdown of protestors in 1970 and 1976 as 
well as raising the costs of basic necessities without raising the wages. The second 
demand that Walesa had was for the workers to realize the importance of unity “in the 
face of official attempts to divide them.”138 The demands were soon agreed to and 
Walesa declared the strike over, however, he soon changed his mind after other, smaller 
workers organizations were asking for more. This led to a reinstatement of the strike and 
a list of 21 more demands.139 
The riots began on August 14, 1980. The KOR and other trade union 
organizations had already established an underground form of messaging prior to the 
riots. By August 16, a leaflet, poster and internal public announcement system had been 
created.140 The leadership and underground organization of Solidarity used this 
messaging system to inform the crowds what was happening and increase public support 
for the protests. The leaflets and flyers would use narratives and symbols that invoked the 
nationalism and heritage of resistance that the Poles related to.141 The bulletins also 
served to praise Solidarity and give attention to the political and economic conditions of 
the country. 
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Catholic Mass was also used outside the shipyards, which sent the message that 
the Church was behind the protests and the workers unions, thus against the Socialist 
regime. The church also reinforced the idea that the protests were to be peaceful. The 
cross was used as “a sign of defiance toward the communist regime,” “a metaphor of 
national martyrdom” and “a symbol of Poland as a messiah of nations.”142 
One of the most influential weapons that Solidarity had was outside media outlets. 
The riots of 1980 let the Eastern Bloc countries and the world know that there were 
fractures within the communist satellite states. This led to advertisement by western 
countries of how the resistance elements were exacerbating the fractures. In 1982, a 
television show was produced in the U.S. called “Let Poland Be Poland.” The show was 
“beamed across the world”143 in an effort to reduce the martial law that the regime 
enacted in Poland in 1981. During this period, the regime withdrew the freedom to 
assemble from the people and also began controlling all media outlets and speech. The 
show was intended to reach an estimated 400 million people; however it only reached 
about 90 million homes.144 In the film, Walesa portrayed himself as “the embodiment of 
the gritty, Catholic, patriotic Polish worker.”145 
Although the success of “Let Poland Be Poland” is up for debate, it did empower 
Solidarity to know that they had the backing of Democratic countries.146 With the help of 
the U.S., a significant amount of anti-Communist propaganda was aimed at Poland to 
include: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and underground newspapers. This was 
key due to restrictive conditions inside Poland. This effect of outside-in influence in 
heavily controlled areas ensured that Solidarity remained relevant and strong throughout 
the martial law period. 
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The media primarily used by Solidarity were the underground newspapers and 
flyers. The flyers focused on symbols that emphasized Polish nationalism, unity and the 
economic and political conditions that the Soviets had imposed. These elements 
expanded the Solidarity narrative and helped to grow the movements’ active supporters. 
Nationalism, unity and poor economic conditions were used to incite actions against the 
regime and gather recruits for the expanding underground and auxiliary elements.  
The leadership augmented media efforts by emphasizing unity. Walesa was 
instrumental in uniting the various workers unions, as was the KOR. Walesa embodied 
the average Polish worker as he grew up in both the Nazi and Soviet controlled state and 
was a member of the 1970 and 1976 riots. Walesa served a few terms in jail throughout 
the 70s for actions against the state, which validated him amongst the people as a resistor.  
The Church served to expand the base of support for Solidarity, as religion was 
extremely important to the Poles. The Pope’s speech in 1979 served to unite the people 
against the Soviet controlled puppet regime and although he did not give explicit backing 
to Solidarity, it was made clear that an independent Poland should be a shared goal. In 
1980, Solidarity used the church to emphasize the principles of non-violence and as a 
motivating factor for the protestors legitimizing that what they were doing was right. 
D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS 
1. Commitment and Motivation 
Solidarity was able to maintain their commitment to a free Poland even after 
martial law was enacted in 1981. The group was forced to move underground and 
conduct all their operations in a clandestine manner. The regime’s control during this 
time ensured that anyone caught engaging in subversive behavior would be jailed. The 
church provided the outlet needed to continue to provide motivation to the people of 
Poland. 
Propaganda was used to not only insight dissatisfaction with the regime, but also 
to show that the leaders of Solidarity were still committed to regime change. External 
support ensured that the resistance was well resourced helping retain the commitment of 
the people.  
 60 
Commitment to the cause can also be seen in the lack of corruption found inside 
the movement. Initially, there was a struggle for who would represent the group. 
However, once Walesa was selected, all the trade unions and different factions rallied 
behind him. There was almost no syphoning off of organization money or materials. This 
shows that the leadership and the underground members were committed to the cause 
over personal gain. 
The commitment and motivation displayed by the leadership of Solidarity resulted 
in Lech Walesa being elected as the President in 1991. The election shows that the people 
trusted the leadership and their commitment to the cause. The goal of Solidarity remained 
constant throughout its nearly 20-year struggle. By constantly putting themselves at risk 
against a target regime that was not afraid to use force, or imprisonment, members of the 
group proved that they had a high level of commitment to a free Poland. 
2. Flexibility and Adaptability 
The ability of the group to transition from public protest movements to a more 
clandestine organization showed flexibility. This transition ensured that the group was 
able to stay viable during a period when the target regime retained a high degree of 
control. Solidarity also showed adaptability by being able to morph from trade unions and 
political organizations into a resistance movement with a clear and coherent goal. 
The change in tactics showed that the group could coordinate and disseminate its 
messages effectively. Group members used the Church to do this, while also using the 
freedom of movement that the clergy had to communicate with third party countries. 
Rather than risk their own imprisonment, they used the organization that they knew 
would cause incredible backlash for the target regime if suppressed.  
Solidarity rapidly used regime actions to create more propaganda and gather more 
popular support. After the riots in 1980, Solidarity immediately capitalized on the 
regimes actions and demanded concessions. Initially, the concessions were granted giving 
Solidarity an incredible base of support, not just as a resistance group, but as a legitimate 
political alternative.  
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3. Tangible Support 
Numerous organizations and countries gave external support to Solidarity, which 
contributed to the development of propaganda pamphlets and underground newspapers 
creating pressure against the target regime. International involvement immediately gave 
the group legitimacy as a viable political alternative. Money and intelligence was 
provided from Israel, the U.S. and the Vatican. This increased the tangible support for 
Solidarity by providing it with materials that were not attainable through normal supply 
sources as well as intelligence the regimes expected actions. 
The church assisted in rallying thousands of members to the cause over a short 
period of time. The Catholic Church involvement also served to garner the international 
support that the resistance eventually received. Having the Pope openly support the cause 
of a free Poland was a powerful catalyst to gather popular support. Even for the portion 
of the population that did not want to openly support the resistance, the involvement of 
the church helped ensure that they would not support the regime. 
Due to the restricted freedom of movement in Poland at the time, a sanctuary was 
not possible. However, Solidarity was able to use existing authorized groups to 
coordinate their actions. Poland was a communist country that put a great deal of 
emphasis on the importance of the worker. The regime could not openly oppose workers’ 
unions, so workers’ unions were used as the platform to coordinate actions against the 
regime. The same was true of the church. The church had such an immense support base 
within Poland that the regime could not directly attack it, so the church was a natural 
organization to coordinate the resistance. 
E. ANALYSIS 
Solidarity is truly a case of strategic UW, where non-violent methods were used 
to enact lasting change. Co-opting and utilizing existing organizations, having the 
organizational capacity to coordinate and accept external support, developing a 
resonating narrative and being flexible enough to adapt to the changing environment of 
martial law were the key factors in Solidarity’s success.  
 62 
The formation of the trade unions after the 1970 Gdansk incident allowed the 
resistance to organize and recruit from a wide base. The initial group was able to expand 
after the regime continued to rely on oppressive measures. This was the case in 1976 
when protests erupted for the same reasons that they did in 1970. Using the trade unions 
as a starting point for organizational development allowed the resistance to gain the 
influence needed amongst the population. The trade unions had significant legitimacy in 
communist Poland. The unions served as a channel to disseminate information and 
coordinate operations. 
Being organized, having a wide base of support and a communication plan 
allowed the resistance element to capitalize on the situation in 1980 when socioeconomic 
conditions were exacerbated by the regime raising food prices and restricting individual 
freedoms. Solidarity was able to gain concessions from the regime very rapidly, but 
ultimately, this led to the enactment of martial law from 1981–1984. The martial law 
policy further deepened the tensions between the populace and the regime, which did 
nothing to help the economic or political situation in Poland.  
The logistics that were provided through external sponsorship increased the 
amount of propaganda that was produced and distributed throughout the cities and ports. 
This allowed for increased motivation and commitment as well as tangible support during 
the period of martial law when operating in the open was very dangerous. The external 
sponsor was able to call attention to the cause both internally and externally to allow for a 
very successful propaganda campaign.  
Intelligence was passed to the underground through existing networks and was 
effectively coordinated among the CIA, Vatican and Solidarity underground. The effect 
of these operations was an increase in international awareness of the conditions in 
Poland. External sponsorship greatly increased the amount of intelligence that Solidarity 
received about the regime’s planned actions. The intelligence also ensured a level of 
security for Solidarity inside Poland during martial law. Finding the right external 
sponsorship for a resistance organization can be a key aspect of successful UW 
campaigns. 
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The group used a broadly framed narrative imbued with nationalistic and 
resistance traditions to appeal to diverse segments of the population. The naming of a 
Polish Pope in 1978 along with his polarizing speech to the Polish people further allowed 
the resistance base of support to expand. Additionally, religion was incorporated into the 
narrative to exacerbate fissures between the populace and the regime.  
The psychological efforts for recruitment and disaggregation of the target regime 
were extremely effective. The use of symbols to convey messages through the church and 
amongst the workers proved effective as a non-violent means of resistance. Just the 
existence of public crosses was a small victory for the resistance and portrayed  
disaffection with the communist regime. Additionally, the actions of Lech Walesa proved 
to be a motivating factor for the resistance as he was truly seen as a leader that 
represented the bulk of Polish people. These efforts and the careful framing of the 
narrative were enough to mobilize a large amount of people to act.  
Using protests, strikes and unauthorized assembly, Solidarity was able to 
capitalize on the principles of non-violent resistance to maintain its moral authority 
against the Polish communist regime. Using the underground to organize its actions, 
Solidarity worked to steadily attrite power from the regime. When martial law occurred, 
Solidarity was outlawed, and many members were jailed. The changing environmental 
conditions called for a strategy shift, which Solidarity was able to rapidly execute. The 
organization showed its flexibility and adaptability by moving from protests and strikes 
to quiet propaganda and psychological operations. Eventually, the regime’s oppressive 
tactics just exacerbated the power shift. 
All of these aspects contributed to the success of Solidarity, but the psychological 
and disruption aspects were the two crucial LOEs used. The extensive use of propaganda 
and well-organized protests allowed the resistance to convey a clear message, which 
provided an alternative to the existing government. The ability of the resistance to 
network effectively with the population as well as external sponsors ensured that the 
movement was well coordinated and remained viable after the 1981 crackdown. 
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V. CASE STUDY III: CONTRAS IN NICARAGUA 1981–1989 
The case of the Contra rebels against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is a 
violent insurgency that had significant support from the U.S. as an external sponsor. The 
insurgency took nine years to succeed and had to overcome a fractured insurgent 
organization and U.S. scandal. From 1981 to 1989, the U.S. supported the Contra rebels 
with arms, ammunition, training, advice, money, a safe haven and international backing. 
As a result of the U.S. support, the Contras were able to conduct disruption operations, 
develop psychological narratives targeting the Sandinista regime’s oppressive actions, 
gather intelligence about regime activities and keep the guerrillas well-armed and 
equipped. In 1989, the Sandinistas were removed from power following democratic 
elections, however they remain as one of Nicaragua’s leading political powers even 
today. The Contra insurgency ended through legitimate political means, but used violence 
throughout its nearly ten-year existence to achieve its goal.  
The role of the U.S. in the Contra case cannot be overstated. As an external 
sponsor, U.S. actions and role in the insurgency were counterproductive in many regards. 
The failure of the U.S. to develop a sound operational strategy prior to intervening nearly 
ended the insurgency before it could gain any real ground. It took the unification of the 
Contra rebel groups and an understanding that insurgent violence must be proportional 
with or less than state repression for the movement to succeed. Although the insurgency 
was successful at regime change numerous mistakes were partially responsible for the 
long duration of the campaign. This case study will examine the connection between the 
proposed framework and the Contra insurgency. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
During the late 1970s, the U.S. began competing with the Soviet Union over 
influence in Nicaragua. At the time, the Sandinista regime had just come to power and 
the Carter administration had given over 90 million dollars in aid to persuade the 
Sandinistas to become pro-U.S. Unfortunately, not long after the aid began, the 
Sandinistas began passing repressive laws that suppressed the freedom of the press and 
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political organization.147 The Sandinistas also signed economic, cultural, scientific and 
technological agreements with the Soviets.148 As a result, President Carter cancelled all 
aid to the Sandinistas and ordered the CIA to begin drawing up plans to overthrow the 
regime. By 1981, President Ronald Reagan was in office and concerted efforts to support 
the anti-Sandinista movements were rapidly put in place. The Sandinista military wing 
was known as the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN became the main target 
for the anti-Sandinista movement. The insurgent movement was composed of numerous 
groups, but primarily was known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). The FDN 
and the other smaller rebel groups were collectively called the Contras.  
The president authorized the CIA to equip, train and fund the Contra rebels to 
facilitate the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. The CIA and special operations forces 
(SOF) executed the training in Argentina and set up operating bases for the Contras in  
Honduras and Costa Rica. Initially, the operations were moderately successful, but in 
1982 the U.S. Congress passed the Boland amendment, which prohibited U.S. funding 
for the purpose of overthrowing a government. The Reagan administration circumvented 
this law by claiming that the U.S. was not overthrowing the government, the Contras 
were. To further muddy the waters, the U.S. also began seeking funding from third party 
donors. The CIA successfully obtained funding from countries such as Israel and through 
private corporations, but in 1984 a CIA operation to mine the Nicaraguan harbors became 
public and support for the Contras dwindled in the U.S.149 In addition to the internal 
difficulties in the U.S., the Contras were accused of numerous human rights abuses 
including rape, torture, extortion and terrorist activities.150 The Contras were not unified 
and dealt with a lot of internal dissention among commanders. These activities eventually 
led to the democratic reelection of the Sandinista regime in 1984 despite their repressive 
laws governing the freedom of the Nicaraguan people. 
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The Contras continued their violence throughout the mid-1980s, resulting in over 
43,000 casualties and $12 billion in damages.151 The U.S. continued to support the 
Contras covertly until 1987, when the Iran-Contra scandal was uncovered and Congress 
convened investigations against members of the National Security Council for illegally 
funding the rebel group. 
By 1989, elections were held again in Nicaragua and the many Contra groups 
finally acted as a united force distributing leaflets and assembling under the United 
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO). In August of the same year, 50 FSLN members were 
assassinated and the Contras deployed over 8,000 troops into Nicaragua from camps 
within Honduras and Costa Rica.152 The UNO won the election, but the Sandinistas still 
retained a majority of parliament seats. 
B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Target Regime 
The Sandinista movement and FSLN were originally formed in the 1960s and 
sought to rid Nicaragua of the Somoza dynasty, which it perceived as a puppet 
government of the U.S.153 The group broadly defined itself to the population as 
democratic; however, in reality, it had socialist leanings.154 The FSLN recruited heavily 
within the poor areas and took power from Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979. 
After coming to power, the Sandinistas nationalized most of the farmland within 
the country and confiscated the wealth of citizens who had been gone for over six 
months. The culmination of economic shifts and socialist reforms created some 
dissention among the Nicaraguan people as they were suffering from poor economic 
conditions. This caused some defections within the party to include Arturo Cruz and 
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Eden Pastora, who declared that they would begin countering the regime. Numerous 
other military defectors followed bringing a significant number of their troops with them.  
In addition to the economic changes, the Sandinistas began a campaign of 
widespread oppression against religious and Indian groups. The Miskito Indians are the 
inhabitants of Nicaraguans Atlantic coast and perhaps experienced the worst oppression. 
The FSLN relocated over 15,000 Miskito Indians and imprisoned, tortured, executed and 
destroyed the villages of many more.155 
Feeling threatened by the defections and creation of rebel groups, the FSLN 
declared a state of emergency in 1982 after one of the groups blew up two bridges that 
were used as a transportation line for the shipment of materials into El-Salvador.156 
Under a state of emergency, the FSLN began restricting more individual freedoms such 
as: the right to organize a demonstration, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and the 
freedom to strike. 
The FSLN was receiving extensive support from the Soviets at this time, for not 
only expanding their Marxist-Leninist form of government, but also for facilitating 
support to rebels in El Salvador. The FSLN underwent significant internal and external 
pressure to legitimize itself through public elections in the early 1980s and in 1984 finally 
relented and held democratic elections in Nicaragua. The FSLN won; however, some 
argue that the elections were rigged.157 
The FSLN began to enact oppressive measures once put into power. The socialist 
re-distribution of farmland and harsh oppressive measures against religious groups and 
Indians forced the defection of numerous party officials. These measures along with the 
state of emergency led to the disaffection of a large portion of the population as well.  
When the FSLN won the 1984 election, the Contra groups were in the midst of a 
human rights scandal that undermined the legitimacy of the insurgents. In addition, the 
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U.S. external support for the Contras was widely publicized and did not help the Contras 
efforts, as one of the reasons the Sandinistas came to power in the first place was to get 
rid of U.S. influence. Again, this hindered the insurgents from being a credible alternative 
to the Sandinistas. Still the FSLN was an oppressive regime that created an environment 
rife for an insurgency. 
2. Insurgent Influence 
Many political and military defectors of the Sandinista regime led the Contra 
groups, which gave the groups an existing structure and hierarchy to organize. The 
primary leaders of these organizations were Edgar Chamorro, Adolfo Calero and Enrique 
Bermudez. Bermudez’ group was one of the most controversial. Bermudez was a 
National Guard leader whom had defected with a large number of his soldiers to 
Honduras during the revolution that brought the Sandinistas to power. During the early 
1980s, Bermudez and his soldiers were accused of numerous human rights violations 
along the Honduran border including rape, looting, extortion and terrorist activities.158  
This led to the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), run by Eden Pastora and 
Alfonso Robelo, to not accept any former National Guardsmen into their ranks.159 As a 
result, the Contras remained largely divided. These divisions prevented the insurgency 
from having a cohesive narrative and led the population to question the true motives of 
the groups. 
The accusations against Bermudez and the fractures amongst the insurgent groups 
led the U.S. to push for unity under one group. Edgar Chamorro emerged as the 
spokesman for the insurgents in late 1982; however, Bermudez and his group of soldiers 
still clearly had the most power amongst rebel groups.160 Eventually, Bermudez was 
named as the leader of the military wing of the FDN, with Chamorro as the spokesman 
and Adolfo Calero as the political leader. However, internal squabbling persisted. The 
groups continued to feud about their roles, responsibilities and personal issues. The 
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ARDE and FDN refused to work with one another, which led to a failed invasion by the 
ARDE in 1984.161 It was not until the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was 
founded in 1985 that the ARDE and FDN finally began working together under the 
leadership of Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz.162 This paved the way for 
all the disparate groups, who had little influence outside their own factions to work 
together to achieve their one goal. 
A networking success that the insurgents had from the start was their ability to 
garner international support for their cause. It was routine for members of the FDN and 
ARDE leadership to visit foreign countries and obtain funding and political support.163 
This created significant international pressure on the target regime and empowered the 
insurgents to act. From 1981 to 1984, the Contra groups received over $80 million in aid, 
over 200 personnel to assist the Honduran army with training, 114 Green Berets assisting 
with training the Contras and 150 CIA personnel for planning and intelligence 
gathering.164 This high level of external support compelled the Sandinistas to seek aid 
from external sponsors as well, including the Soviet Union. 
The ability of the Contras to gather external support and use existing hierarchies 
to organize and conduct operations was vital to the quick start in fighting the government. 
However, the infighting between the insurgent groups had a negative effect on the ability 
of the organization to conduct operations and win popular support. The infighting, lack of 
unity and human rights violations along with the election in 1984 set the insurgency back 
and further legitimized the Sandinista government. Additionally, the insurgents focused 
their efforts on guerrilla actions and not networking amongst the population. The lack of 
insurgent influence on the population did not help the insurgents win tangible support. 
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C. LINES OF EFFORT 
1. Disruption  
The Contra resistance was largely dominated by military actions and is 
representative of its military leadership and membership. As a result, numerous 
disruption operations against the Sandinista government occurred. Most of them were an 
effort to prepare for some sort of large scale offensive that was to be the culminating 
blow to overthrow the Sandinista regime. This led many to question what the ultimate 
goal of the Contras was. During a 1987 conference, many experts on the resistance and 
Central America debated this very point. Was the goal to win the support of the 
population, disrupt the Nicaraguan economy or to force the regime to change its 
repressive policies?165 These questions arose, because although the disruption was vast, it 
was largely ineffective. The disruption operations gave the perception that the resistance 
was growing and gaining strength. The reality was that these were not well thought out 
operations and did nothing to win the support of the population or disrupt the target 
regime to any real extent. Disruption operations in a UW environment can have a 
powerful effect if targeted to achieve certain insurgent goals such as: winning tangible 
support, exploiting or causing oppressive actions by the regime and reactions or 
exacerbating fractures within the regime. Despite many costly and significant offensive 
operations conducted by the Contras from 1981–1988, it was not until 1989 when they 
were united and acting under one coherent strategy that their disruption operations had a 
significant enough an effect to cripple the Sandinista regime. 
The first significant disruption operation was in March of 1982. One of the U.S. 
and Contra goals during the conflict was to prevent the Sandinistas from reinforcing the 
El Salvadoran rebels with supplies from across the border.166 To achieve this, the Contras 
blew up two bridges that were used heavily to transport supplies across the border. This 
operation got the regime’s attention and made them realize that the Contra insurgency 
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posed a real threat to their power.167 As a result, the Sandinista regime began restricting 
individual freedoms and rights. This is what became known as the state of emergency.168 
This operation actually gave the Contras a great opportunity to exploit the regimes heavy-
handed actions because blowing up the bridges had very little effect on the population 
itself, but the regime was severely punishing the population in an effort to root out the 
insurgents. Unfortunately, this occurred in the midst of the infighting and allegations of 
human rights abuses by Bermudez, which negated any positive effects that they may have 
had.169 
The next major disruption operation was conducted to isolate Nicaragua 
economically by mining the harbors of the country. This operation, which was largely 
conducted by the U.S. as the external sponsor, had numerous negative consequences. In 
late 1983, the head of the CIA, William Casey, advocated for an increase in operations 
and recruitment by the Contras.170 Casey believed that the pressure was already getting to 
the Sandinista regime and that by isolating them economically, while conducting a two-
front offensive from Costa Rica and Honduras, the regime would fall. The CIA 
conducted the mining operation and had the FDN take responsibility for it. Unfortunately, 
not long after the mining occurred, ships from over six other nations began sinking as a 
result of the mines. Additionally, local fishermen were killed who were just trying to 
provide for their families.171 This caused the public sentiment to turn on the Contras and 
domestic pressure began to mount against the CIA to discontinue support. The domestic 
pressure in the U.S. resulted in the Boland Amendment, which prevented the CIA from 
providing support to the Contras. External sponsor operations must be carefully 
coordinated with the resistance elements and directed in a manner that is consistent with  
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keeping public support while undermining regime support. The mining of the harbors 
clearly underestimated the effects that it would have on international perception and local 
sentiment among the population. 
As part of the overall operation during the mining fiasco, the Contras also 
conducted port raids and airport bombings. The intent of these operations was to create 
economic pressure and insight internal dissatisfaction amongst the populace. Again, the 
effects on the population were not fully thought out and innocent people died. As a result, 
the internal dissatisfaction was directed against the insurgency and not the regime. The 
external sponsor involvement in all these operations de-legitimized the insurgency and 
led the population to view the movement as a puppet of the U.S. This led to strong 
feelings among the population who had recently overthrown the Somoza regime in favor 
of the Sandinistas for the very same reason.  
Disruption was the most heavily used line of effort by the Contra insurgency with 
the U.S. as an external sponsor. However, it was not properly geared toward the elements 
that make an insurgency successful: tangible support, commitment and motivation, 
flexibility and adaptability. The insurgency should have known that bombing the airport 
would further isolate them and not the regime from the populace.  
2. Intelligence 
The U.S. developed three goals for their external support to the Contras: prevent 
supplies from flowing into El Salvador, eliminate the Cuban presence and eliminate the 
Cuban Nicaraguan support structure. To accomplish these goals the U.S. provided 
significant logistics and military support to the Contras. However, an important part of 
targeting the Cuban support in Nicaragua was identifying and understanding the 
dynamics of the support and the regime reliance on this support. To accomplish this, the 
CIA sought to use 500 agents to train indigenous forces to operate inside of Nicaragua 
and “carry out political action and paramilitary missions.”172 The CIA used many 
existing contacts within Nicaragua to start their campaign, but increasingly began to rely 
on the Contras for intelligence as restrictions within the country increased.  
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Intelligence operations were very difficult to conduct by the Americans because 
freedom of movement within Nicaragua was limited. The CIA relied on the Contras and 
developed front organizations to assist them in conducting their intelligence operations 
within Nicaragua.  One such organization was the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED).  
[The NED was designed] for the purpose of promoting foreign democratic 
institutions. But the NED also created a cover for the United States to 
funnel money to pro-U.S. groups in hostile countries. And it subsidized 
Washington’s growing community of neoconservatives who wrote op-ed 
articles in leading newspapers and went on TV news shows advocating an 
aggressive U.S. foreign policy.173 
The CIA backed effort focused on swaying media support to the Contras, which 
would then in turn sway popular support to the Contras. This did not work however 
because the U.S. was so overt about its support and the people of Nicaragua viewed the 
rebellion as one controlled by the U.S. By focusing on the domestic and international 
support for the Contra movement, the Nicaraguan public was neglected.  
The reliance on the Contras to provide the psychological and strategic intelligence 
for the Americans proved to be a mistake in the early years of the insurgency. The 
military background of the insurgents likely had an impact in the target selection. The 
target selection focused too much on hurting infrastructure and not enough on the impact 
it had on the populace. This resulted in the targeting of infrastructure that was valuable to 
the public versus only being valuable to the regime.  
3. Logistics 
The logistics provided by the U.S. to the Contra insurgent groups was immense. 
As mentioned earlier, nearly $80 million in aid was provided in just the first four years 
along with over 300 personnel to facilitate training.174 The majority of U.S. logistics 
assistance came in the form of weapons, ammunition, clothing and food rations. This 
assistance was largely overt and occurred in the form of airdrops to not only the insurgent 
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sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica, but also Nicaragua. The other significant aspect 
of U.S. logistics support to the Contras was the efforts by the U.S. National Security 
Council (NSC) to circumvent Congressional oversight and continue to secure funding 
and support despite the Boland Amendment. Both the overt and covert efforts of the U.S. 
to keep the Contras supplied and funded contributed to the relevancy of the insurgency; 
however, it negatively impacted both the Contras and U.S. standing in Nicaragua. The 
overt support led the populace to believe that the Contras were nothing without U.S. 
assistance and the covert support, once discovered, led the population of Nicaragua and a 
large portion of Latin America to believe that the U.S. could not be trusted. 
The U.S. began supporting the Contras in December of 1981 with the construction 
of facilities for the insurgents to operate out of in Honduras along with airstrips and 
training venues.175 This support continued unabated until 1982 when the first Boland 
Amendment was passed. Despite the Boland Amendment saying that any U.S. support to 
overthrow of the Sandinista regime is outlawed, the CIA and the administration were able 
to make the case that support to the Contras could still continue as the U.S. was 
supporting the Contras and not the direct overthrow of the Sandinista regime. After the 
first Boland Amendment was passed, nearly 19 million dollars was given to the Contras 
by the U.S. to continue operations.176 Supplying the Contras with weapons, ammunition 
and equipment was essential to the U.S. plan as disruption was the priority. From 1981 to 
1984, the Contras had sufficient equipment and supplies to continue operations as they 
saw fit. The U.S. was very responsive to the needs of the group until 1984 when logistics 
support began to taper off as domestic political pressure mounted due to the human rights 
accusations and the mining of the harbors. 
This domestic pressure eventually led to the second Boland Amendment being 
passed, which outlawed any support to the Contras. This led the CIA to mount a covert 
effort to not only secure funds, but also continue to provide logistics support and airdrops 
via third party cut outs and front companies. This effort was run by then CIA director 
William Casey and executed by Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Oliver North, who was a 
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member of the national security staff. The name of the effort was referred to as “The 
Enterprise.” North was assigned the tasks of continuing to fund, equip and support the 
Contras in their efforts to overthrow the Sandinista regime. It was up to North to establish 
a ``mirror image outside the government of what the CIA had done” from 1981–1984.177 
This meant obtaining third party funds, establishing and maintaining logistical supplies, 
coordination of training, supplying weapons and assisting the Contras with any other 
necessities that were required. North testified that “I was told not to tell other people, not 
to talk about it, to keep my operational role very, very secret, that it should not be 
something that others came to know about.’“178 
North continued successfully in this endeavor until the summer of 1986 when a 
supply plane was shot down over Nicaragua and the pilot was identified as an American. 
This led to a congressional investigation and the covert support was uncovered along 
with a monetary link to an Iranian Arms for Hostages operation. The scandal was known 
as the Iran Contra affair. 
Although North was the backbone of the Enterprise, there were many other 
individuals that contributed significantly to the effort, primarily third party nations and 
donors. Robert McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, and Casey had already 
garnered considerable support from other nations since the first Boland Amendment was 
passed in 1982 and set up many of the funding meetings for North. North would then go 
meet with the third party nations or donors and ensure them that their anonymity would 
be kept. North stated “the arrangements I had made with foreign governments to deliver 
surface-to-air missiles and ammunition, all of those things I had been told to give the 
commitment of the United States that it wouldn’t be revealed.”179 The extrinsic 
motivation of the nations was counted on in order to maintain funding. Knowing that 
many of the nations wanted to be on the good side of the U.S. enabled much of the 
funding. 
                                                 





High-profile businessmen were also solicited, including Joseph Coors, the 
founder of Coors Brewing Company, who provided $65,000.00 to the cause.180 The State 
Department under George Schultz also reached out to sympathetic governments for 
assistance to include Saudi Arabia, Israel and Korea. Retired General John Singlaub also 
was instrumental in the funding effort travelling to Taiwan and securing millions of 
dollars for support to the Contras.181  
Initially, much of the money would be disbursed directly to the Contras who 
would then use Enterprise approved contacts to purchase whatever they needed. In 1985, 
Secord and North both agreed that the Enterprise should handle the purchases in order to 
ensure that the Contras were using the money as Casey and the NSC wanted them to. 
This showed a level of distrust on the part of the external sponsor indicating that funds 
were being mismanaged or corruption was occurring in the Contra ranks. 
The uncovering of the Contra support in 1986 led to many congressional hearings. 
However, in 1987, support to the Contras was again allowed, but was restricted to 
intelligence sharing and logistics support that did not directly enable military and para-
military operations. This continued support allowed the Contras to continue to operate 
after the disparate factions were unified and eventually ousted the Sandinista regime. 
Support of an insurgency by an external sponsor should remain covert when 
possible. Overt support to gain domestic “buy in” along with international pressure on the 
target regime may de-legitimize the insurgency and portray them as weak to the 
population, reducing popular support, which in turn reduces tangible support. It was not 
until the U.S. began scaling back their support for the Contras and acting covertly that the 
insurgency was forced to unify and began to re-gain some legitimacy after the mining 
incident and the bombing of Sandino airport. 
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4. Psychological 
The U.S. executed numerous psychological operations against both the 
Nicaraguan public and the U.S. public from 1982–1986 in order to garner support. This 
included exploiting Sandinista actions, trying to underwrite unfavorable Contra actions, 
distributing leaflets about the evils of Soviet controlled and influenced governments and 
linking terrorism to the Sandinistas and Soviets.182 This again shows that the level of 
U.S. action was too great in the Contra affair and failed to put the insurgent in front and 
give them more input into operations.  However, the insurgency was still able to recover 
and eventually win. 
In Latin America, the U.S. was being linked to many of the atrocities that were 
occurring in Nicaragua. This resulted in an effort by the U.S. to attach these incidents to 
the actions of the Soviet Union. In order to facilitate this, the administration had military 
psychological operations develop a pamphlet for congress and the press that linked 
“Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista government as a state sponsor of terrorism… who 
themselves were infamous for acts of terrorism, including extra-judicial executions and 
attacks on civilian targets.”183 This occurred after the second Boland Amendment and in 
some ways it eased the apprehension that some members of Congress had toward 
supporting the insurgency, but it did little to sway support for the U.S. actions in 
Nicaragua or Latin America. 
Much of the propaganda effort was focused on getting third party donations and 
securing funding for the Contras. In 1982, the administration started this campaign but 
the “Reagan administration officials soon began crossing lines that separated an overseas 
propaganda program from a domestic propaganda operation aimed at U.S. public opinion, 
the American press and congressional Democrats who opposed contra funding.”184 The 
focus on U.S. domestic opinion and funding diverted efforts away from what was really 
important to overthrow the Sandinista regime, which was Nicaraguan public opinion.  
                                                 




Nicaraguan public opinion of both the Contras and the U.S. was heavily damaged 
in 1986 when the U.S. provided the Contras with a manual called Psychological 
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. The manual “explained how to rationalize killing 
civilians and also made recommendations like hiring professional killers for some 
missions.”185 The manual also detailed how to invoke riots and shootings. The revelation 
of the manual had very damaging effects because the U.S. continued to deny any 
involvement in the human rights abuses of the Contras. The manual gave ammunition to 
the Sandinista government that the U.S. was not only in control of the Contras, but that 
they were responsible for the human rights abuses that occurred against the population. 
By not focusing the propaganda efforts on the Nicaraguan public, the U.S. failed 
to secure popular support for the Contras and failed to shape the Contras’ public image. 
The overt support and aid from the U.S. led the public to believe that the Contras were 
just a puppet of the U.S. rather than a legitimate, self-sufficient insurgent group. The 
effort to use propaganda to gain funding from third parties was extremely successful, as 
the U.S. was able to gain $34 million in funding from 1984–1986.186  However, the 
funding should not have been more important than the other aspects of tangible support 
needed to succeed such as tolerance and intelligence. 
D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS 
1. Commitment and Motivation 
Commitment and motivation may have been high within the various training 
camps along the borders, but it was not high among the leadership of the different 
insurgent organizations who were working toward different and sometimes opposing 
goals. The infighting among the various leaders within the Contras shows that the 
commitment to the cause was low. Calero, Cruz and Bermudez all gave up high-ranking 
military positions within the Sandinista regime to fight. They undertook significant risk, 
believing that the overthrow of the Sandinistas would be possible. Their individual 
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methods for achieving regime change were different and they could not agree on a 
coherent operational strategy. This divided the Contras divided and gave the perception 
that they were a worse alternative for the people than the Sandinista regime. 
The external sponsor had to emplace mechanisms to ensure that the money being 
provided was used to advance the cause. This distrust of the Contra leadership also shows 
a low level of commitment. Using support for personal gain or power is an indicator that 
the insurgent leadership was not committed to the cause. Eventually, the leadership came 
to understand that they were much stronger together than apart and unified under UNO. 
Once this occurred and the external U.S. support was reduced, the Contras were able to 
overthrow the Sandinistas and take control of the country.  The initial lack of 
commitment was overcome to achieve the goal 
2. Flexibility and Adaptability 
Flexibility and adaptability was not shown during the first five years of the 
insurgency as the U.S. and Contras both failed to amend their plans to target the regime, 
rather than seizing terrain. The Contras planned many offensive operations that focused 
on expanding the physical terrain they controlled. The military leadership that dominated 
the Contras believed that this was the way to pressure the Sandinista regime, rather than 
exploiting target regime fissures and expanding popular support. After the 1984 bombing 
of Sandino Airport, and the mining debacle, the insurgents should have seen that their 
plan was failing to produce results. 
The operational strategy of the Contras stayed the same until U.S. support was 
rescinded in 1986. From 1986 to 1989, the Contras finally began to show flexibility and 
shifted their plans to target regime individuals rather than focus on seizing physical 
terrain. The shift in strategy created more tolerance among the people because the 
populations land and livelihood were no longer being threatened. 
The Contras also showed flexibility by seeking a political solution in 1989 rather 
than a military coup. By using the political process to seize power they immediately were 
able to gain legitimacy with the Nicaraguan public and the international community as  
 
 81 
well. Even though the Contras used a significant amount of violence to weaken the 
regime’s control, they were able to overcome this by using the political process to oust 
the Sandinistas. 
3. Tangible Support 
The insurgency must be seen as legitimate to the population in order to be 
successful. Overt or excessive external support can actually reduce the tolerance aspect of 
tangible support that an insurgency needs. Although the U.S. was assisting the insurgency 
in gaining manpower, funding, materiel and intelligence the insurgents lacked the 
tolerance of the people.  Paul et al. explains that “treating the population as the center of 
gravity will lead to the desired outcome; that outcome is less certain when insurgents’ 
tangible support does not come from the population.”187 When the U.S. began advertising 
their support to the Contras to put external pressure on the Sandinista regime, they 
actually undermined positive perceptions of the insurgency. The people began seeing the 
insurgents as puppets of the west and reduced their popular support.  
This had a negative effect in the insurgents’ battle to be seen as a legitimate 
alternative to the Sandinista government. The Contras responded to this by conducting 
disruption operations, but they negatively affected the population thus pushing them 
further towards the Sandinistas.  
The external sponsor heavily supplemented other areas of tangible support such 
as; sanctuary, materials and ammo. The U.S. provided these to the Contras in abundance, 
which clearly gave the groups an initial advantage and enabled them to start operations 
much earlier than they would have been able to. The value of the sanctuary gave the 
Contras an area to plan and coordinate operations in safety. The sanctuaries of Honduras 
and Costa Rica also allowed the insurgents to attack from two fronts. Many of the 
offensive operations that were planned utilized the two sanctuaries to push across the 
border and seize land from both the north and the south. 
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The tangible support provided by the external sponsor was vast, but should have 
been more focused on building the capabilities of the Contras beyond their guerrilla 
forces. More emphasis should have been placed on increasing the organizational capacity 
to be seen as a legitimate alternative to the Sandinistas.   
E. ANALYSIS 
Many lessons can be learned from the Contra insurgency. Although it was 
resolved through an election, from 1981–1986 the UW campaign focused too heavily on 
disruption and material support versus fostering the three attributes that are correlated 
with insurgent success: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and 
adaptability. It was not until the Contra leaders showed the ability to adapt and the FDN 
and ARDE created UNO that they began to make gains among the populace and grow. 
Additionally, after 1986 the Contras began to downplay the U.S. support and took more 
of a lead role in the conflict, which reduced the stigma of being a U.S. puppet 
organization. 
The overt support of an insurgency by an external sponsor should not be used. 
These efforts, while helpful in the short term de-legitimize the insurgency and portray 
them as weak to the population, which can actually reduce the tolerance of the 
population. It was not until the U.S. began scaling back their support for the Contras and 
acting covertly that the insurgency was forced to unify and began to gain some of their 
legitimacy back after the mining incident and the bombing of Sandino airport. 
Using excessive force was detrimental to the success of the Contras. The use of 
force and disrupting the populace served to de-legitimize the insurgency over time and 
alienated them from the population. The disruption operations that the Contras 
conducted, such as mining the harbors and bombing Sandino Airport, did not 
disaggregate the target regime and actually alienated the population. This was validated 
by the results of the 1984 elections. 
The ability of the Contras to finally unite in 1986 and shift their focus to regime 
targets contributed significantly to the ultimate success of UNO through political means. 
After external support was diminished, the Contra elements were forced to work together. 
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The elements came together under UNO and the leadership of Calero, Robelo and Cruz. 
The guerrilla elements then shifted their efforts to targeting Sandinista political 
leadership. This led to more violence, but the basic services and everyday life for the 
population was not affected. The insurgents’ ability to adapt to the changing environment 
took time, but eventually was sufficient to enable their success. UW practitioners should 
ensure objectivity when determining the operational strategy. As the environment 
changes, so should strategy. 
The tangible support provided by the insurgent sanctuaries in Honduras and 
Argentina was vital for the military force that was conducting operations. Since the 
Contra insurgency focused their efforts heavily on disruption, it was necessary to have a 
safe haven for the insurgents to refit and rearm after operations. By using sanctuaries 
outside the target country, the target regime was unable to engage them directly, therefore 
the Contras were able to continue operations despite the state of emergency that was 
declared from 1982–1988. A sanctuary is a vital element of tangible support that can be 
provided by the external sponsor. 
The U.S. helped to gather international support and create pressure on the regime 
and therefore assisted the Contras with being seen as a legitimate organization. The overt 
support that the U.S. provided and the human rights abuse accusations somewhat 
countered these gains. Nevertheless being recognized as a legitimate alternative to the 
Sandinistas by the international community provided the insurgents with motivational 
support. Through the use of media and messaging, the U.S. was able to gain monetary 
support from many third party countries and people for the Contra organization.  
The U.S., as an external sponsor, should have made more of an effort to keep their 
involvement hidden. The Nicaraguan people were already wary of U.S. influence within 
their government. This aspect should have resulted in more of an effort to keep U.S. 
support covert. Having knowledge of the popular sentiments within the target country can 
help the external sponsor understand the psychological impacts of support. The Contras 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85 
VI. CASE STUDY IV: THE PEOPLE’S POWER REVOLUTION, 
PHILIPPINES 1986 
The 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines was the culmination point 
of a rising movement against the Ferdinand Marcos regime that had been building since 
1972. The movement was largely non-violent and motivated by growing discontent 
amongst a population that endured corruption, financial and economic mismanagement 
and the repression of basic democratic freedoms. The movement ended with President 
Marcos being evacuated from the Manila airport to Hawaii via a U.S. plane. Although, 
President Reagan and the U.S. were staunch and loyal supporters of Marcos for most of 
his 20-year reign, the Department of State and U.S. Embassy mission had campaigned for 
his removal since the assassination of one of his rivals in 1983.188 The assassination of 
Begnino Aquino set off a series of events that led to U.S. support for the opposition 
movement and the decision by the U.S. government to have Marcos step down from 
power. U.S. external sponsorship was limited, but actions were taken to help the anti-
Marcos campaign. These actions included: publicly denouncing the Marcos regime 
actions inside the Philippines, support for the anti-Marcos military wing through re-
fueling and sanctuary inside Clark Air Force base, U.S. sponsored election oversight 
organizations, investigations and urging Marcos to flee the Philippines. The ability of the 
anti-Marcos party to induce defections within the top echelons of power and mobilize 
large gathering enabled the movement’s success. The movement was also able to expand 
their memberships through existing organizations such as the Catholic Church, which 
helped with coordination and support.189 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Ferdinand Marcos was elected as President of the Philippines in 1965 and then 
again in 1969. During his second term the gap between the rich and the poor inside the 
Philippines began to grow significantly. This disparity led to the formation of numerous 
                                                 




separatist groups within the Philippines. The two significant groups were the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the New People’s Army (NPA). The MNLF 
existed mainly in the southern Philippines and sought autonomy based on religious 
affiliation. The NPA sought to replace the democratic Philippine regime with a 
communist party system. Marcos was anti-communist and as a result, received significant 
U.S. support to counter these separatist movements in order to remain a democratic 
system.  
In 1972, Marcos’s second term as President was nearing its end. In the Philippine 
democracy, the President was only allowed to run for two terms so Marcos declared 
martial law to retain his authority. He immediately began jailing his political rivals, 
dissolved congress and suppressed the freedom of speech and press.190 One of his many 
rivals was Begnino Aquino. Aquino was arrested and spent the next eight years in jail, all 
the while continuing to denounce Marcos’ martial law policies. After suffering a heart 
attack in jail Aquino was able to seek medical treatment in the U.S. under the agreement 
that he would stop denouncing Marcos and never return to the Philippines. Aquino sought 
exile in the U.S., but remained politically active from afar in the Philippine system, still 
denouncing Marcos and demonstrating to the U.S. that despite being anti-communist, 
Marcos was not pro-democracy. 
In 1983, Marcos’s health was starting to deteriorate so Aquino decided he would 
return to the Philippines to fill any power vacuum that may result. As Aquino was getting 
off the plane in the Manila airport, he was shot and killed. It was this event that led the 
Department of State and prominent members of the Reagan administration to withdraw 
support from Marcos. The anti-Marcos camp included: “Michael H. Armacost, the Under 
Secretary of State and former Ambassador to the Philippines; Stephen A. Bosworth, his 
successor in Manila; Morton I. Abramowitz, the head of State Department intelligence, 
and John Maisto, the Philippine desk officer. They were strengthened by Adm. William J. 
                                                 




Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”191 The group attempted to convince the 
Reagan administration that Marcos’ health, the declining economy and the growing 
communist insurgency were all factors of serious concern that could be partially solved 
by the removal of Marcos. However, President Reagan believed strongly that no good 
alternative existed to Marcos.192 
After the assassination of Aquino, an investigation ensued that implicated General 
Fabian Ver, a high-ranking pro-Marcos official of engineering the assassination. Marcos 
eventually cleared General Ver of all charges in 1985, which again de-legitimized 
Marcos with the perception on cronyism.193 Demonstrations began shortly after the 
assassination as well as increased pressure from the U.S. embassy and State Department 
to intervene in the growing unrest. High-ranking members of the military and business 
elites began publicly calling for a change. Attempts were made to suppress and jail these 
individuals, but growing popular support continued to pressure Marcos for a change. This 
eventually led Marcos to call for elections in 1985 to prove his legitimacy.  
The 1985 election was marred with violence and fraud.194 Marcos seemingly 
won, however the election outcome led to a series of protests. With the growing 
discontent, two military leaders shifted their loyalty away from Marcos. Minister of 
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos decided to stage a coup. 
Initially, the coup did not have a significant amount of support and the Marcos military 
was well on its way to crushing the opposition. The Catholic Church and national radio 
station, Radio Veritas, rallied the people to support the coup. Thousands of protestors 
were mobilized and peacefully stopped any efforts by the pro-Marcos military to arrest or 
kill the defectors.195 The U.S. embassy began providing the opposition with encrypted 
radio traffic and refueled Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) helicopters at 
Clark Air Force base. The Reagan administration could no longer turn a blind eye to the 
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situation in the Philippines and calls were made for Marcos to step down peacefully and 
leave the country. Marcos had to be forced to depart the country under duress by U.S. 
officials and was given exile in Hawaii.196 
B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Target Regime 
The Marcos regime engaged in numerous actions that created fissures between the 
administration and the people. Most notably was the widespread corruption that the 
Marcos regime engaged in, which created economic turmoil. The Marcos regime 
“granted monopolies to local elite whom he appointed as local political leaders.”197 
Additionally, he misappropriated numerous funds to help get re-elected in 1969. The 
creation of monopolies under Marcos created vast amounts of wealth within Marcos 
circle of friends, but left the businesses without political relationships to suffer. After the 
assassination of Aquino in 1983, the Philippine economy began to fall and the Gross 
National Product was reduced by 6.8 percent.198 This led to business elites within the 
Philippines to call for economic change.  
The Marcos regime declared martial law in 1972 to get around a Philippine law 
that forbid any more than two terms as president. Marcos began to jail his political 
opponents after the declaration.199 Marcos also dissolved the Philippine parliament, 
began to consolidate power and restricted individual rights. Marcos was able to gain a 
significant amount of international economic aid from the U.S. and other countries, 
which helped keep the nation solvent until the early 1980s.200 
The assassination of Aquino in 1983 was widely attributed to the Marcos regime. 
Aquino was shot in the head as he exited his plane in Manila. The authorities claimed that 
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he was shot by lone gunmen and attributed the act to the growing communist insurgency. 
Numerous inconsistencies resulted from this story and to sway public opinion, Marcos 
ordered an investigation. The investigation had General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), tried under conspiracy charges for the 
murder. General Ver was a staunch supporter of the Marcos regime and was acquitted of 
all charges in 1985. This was seen by the people as another example of Marcos helping 
his friends and was one of the catalysts that led to the coup d’état and revolution in 
February of 1986. 
The anti-communist struggle that was occurring in the Philippines at the time 
ensured that the U.S. would continue to support the Marcos regime. The Reagan 
administration viewed the Philippines as an important ally in the fight against 
communism during the Cold War. The Reagan administration did not always like Marcos 
actions but believed that he created stability in the region. After Aquino’s death in 1983, 
the U.S. started to change its views a little, but still believed that if unrest occurred the 
NPA would use it as an opportunity to usurp power. The U.S. aid that was provided to the 
Philippines and the economic support that U.S. bases provided kept the Philippines 
economically viable, but after 1983 the business elites began to view the country as 
economically failing due to the high unemployment rate and falling GNP.201 
The Marcos regime was seen as a corrupt dictatorship rather than a democracy. 
After 20 years of ruling the country, Marcos’s economic policies and the restrictions he 
put on both political rivals and individual freedoms resulted in a disenfranchised 
majority. This resulted in numerous organizations to call for reforms. The Catholic 
Church, AFP, student organizations and political parties began calling for the removal of 
Marcos. These parties were able to use the target regimes oppression to unite and 
mobilize a revolution that resulted in regime change. 
2. Insurgent Influence 
The opposition against the Marcos regime was incredibly connected to all aspects 
of society. The business elites that were disenfranchised with the regimes policies were 
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connected to the wealthy segment of the population. The student activists and 
organizations were connected to the youth segment. RAM and the military movement 
had connections inside the regime. United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) 
sought to gain their base of support from the shrinking middle class and the Church 
helped connect them all together. Beginning in the late 1970s, these individual groups 
began making statements that showed their disapproval for the regime. This led to many 
opposition candidates boycotting the 1981 elections.  
The 1981 elections allowed an increase in freedom to criticize the regime. Once 
the demonstrations against the regime began in 1981 these individual groups began to 
start uniting. The opposition leader of UNIDO, Salvador Laurel, even reached out to the 
NPA and the Communist Peoples Party (CPP) to develop alliances.202 Laurel was 
incredibly effective at getting members of other political parties to join in the opposition 
against Marcos. In 1981, he was able to get members of both the nationalist and liberal 
parties to become members of UNIDO.203 
After the Aquino assassination the opposition against Marcos grew even more 
powerful, as the Church became more vocal. Specifically, Cardinal Jaime Sin, who had 
always advocated for reforms against Marcos, began being more active and hosting 
politically oriented events. After Aquino’s death, Cardinal Sin made a speech where he 
spoke of Aquino as a political hero who was “purified by eight years in prison and three 
years in exile and his death caused a miracle.”204 He also stated that the “regime has lost 
all moral authority.”205 This public backing of the opposition by the Church in a heavily 
Catholic area of the country was powerful to motivate people to act against the regime. 
The death of Aquino, coupled with Church endorsements and existing activist 
organizations led to over 165 rallies taking place between August and September of 
1983.206 During the coup d’état in 1986, one of General Enrile’s first phone calls was to 
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Cardinal Sin to ask for his help in stopping the regime from crushing the defectors.207 
Cardinal Sin was able to use Radio Veritas and his opposition connections to mobilize 
enough people to protect Enrile and General Ramos forces. 
The ability of the opposition to co-opt all the disparate groups of society under 
Marcos was essential to their success. Without this, coordination amongst the groups 
would not have been possible. To a large extent, the Church was the connective tissue 
that banded these groups together and allowed them to act in unison. 
C. LINES OF EFFORT 
1. Disruption 
Although, the Peoples Power Revolution was predominantly non-violent in its 
overthrow of Marcos, there was a period in its history where violence was a key tenet. 
When the opposition to Marcos was first starting to organize, they believed that a violent 
regime change campaign was the only way to be successful. In 1978, in an effort to get 
more U.S. backing for the removal of Marcos, the Light a Fire Movement (LAFM) was 
developed.208 The movement was coordinated by a member of the Catholic Church and 
his brother, who wanted to carry out “symbolic acts of sabotage” and send “non-lethal 
letter bombs to shock government technocrats.”209 The purpose was to show the Carter 
administration that there was severe distrust in the Marcos regime and that he was losing 
his grip on control. Aquino supported the plan from his jail cell in Manila and several 
prominent buildings were burned. The acts had the opposite intended effect and President 
Carter increased aide to Marcos and sought for new military base agreements.  
Aquino also supported the April 6 Liberation Movement (A6LM) in 1980. The 
A6LM was more aggressive than the LAFM in their acts against the regime and sought to 
launch a campaign of “massive urban guerrilla warfare,” with bombs and 
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assassinations.210 By this time, Aquino was in exile, but he still sent a warning to Marcos 
on behalf of the A6LM warning that Marcos must reform the regime or hostile actions 
would start taking place.211 In August of 1980, nine explosions took place in Manila that 
injured two and coincided with the trial of some LAFM members.212 More explosions 
followed in September and through November to include a travel agent convention. The 
travel convention target was intended to hurt the tourist industry. The regime began 
tracking down and arresting many of the members in November and it was soon apparent 
that the violence was not having the effect that it was intended to.  
The bombing campaign failed to ignite the revolution that many hoped. The U.S. 
declared that it would not hold any talks with opposition members who had anything to 
do with the insurgent attacks, which hampered Aquino’s ability to gain U.S. support. 
However, the bombing campaign did result in a concession. In December 1980, Marcos’ 
wife Imelda met with Aquino in New York City after Marcos signaled that he was 
willing to negotiate. Aquino demanded the lifting of martial law, and in January 1981, 
martial law was rescinded.213  
After the failure of the violent disruption operations and the lifting of martial law 
in 1981, Aquino determined that the revolution must be conducted as a non-violent mass 
movement. The first non-violent disruption action that was organized was the boycotting 
of the 1981 elections. The opposition candidate was Salvador Laurel. Laurel understood 
that Marcos would not allow him to win, but in order to gain legitimacy decided to run 
anyway. Laurel advocated for a fairer ballot system, which Marcos declined to give him. 
As a result, Laurel and UNIDO boycotted the elections.214 The boycotting further de-
legitimized the regime. Marcos refusal to allow third party members to the election 
commission proved that any elections under Marcos were not fair. This gave UNIDO 
more legitimacy and also gave the people a viable alternative. 
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The disruption campaign truly started taking off after the assassination Aquino in 
1983. The funeral for Aquino was especially disruptive as it served as a rally for all the 
anti-Marcos groups. Protests and rallies were held monthly against the Marcos regime 
and included a variety of topics. Everything from human rights violations, economics, 
anniversaries of Aquinos death and even women’s rights.215  
After the 1986 elections, when once again widespread voter fraud was suspected, 
the coup by Enrile and Ramos occurred. General Ramos and Enrile took their RAM force 
to Camp Aguinaldo and barricaded themselves inside the Ministry of National 
Defense.216 Cardinal Sin called on the people to help protect them and thousands of 
protestors showed up to help prevent General Ver’s forces from overtaking the 
compound. The protestors utilized non-violent methods and tactics to stop the force. The 
protests grew over the course of three days and eventually led to Marcos fleeing. 
The disruption LOE in the Philippine case was significant. The non-violent 
protests served as catalysts to gain strength and de-legitimize the regime. The more non-
violent protests that occurred, the more the regime acted out to suppress them. This led 
more powerful members of society like business elites and politicians to call for change. 
Such loyalty shifts empowered more protests that garnered international attention.  
2. Intelligence 
Intelligence was prominent throughout this campaign for both the target regime 
and the opposition. The target regime, having endured numerous protests and threats 
from 1978–1986 tried to insert sources amongst all the opposition groups. This effort was 
largely successful, as Marcos knew most of the insurgents plans to include the attempted 
coup.217 The opposition did not have as much penetration as the regime did, however 
they were able to successfully plan their operations by understanding the regimes 
reactions. The opposition also had the U.S. embassy under Ambassador Stephen 
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Bosworth, who was instrumental in providing intelligence to both the Reagan 
administration and the opposition about Marcos’ actions and intent during the revolution. 
When the coup occurred on February 22, 1986, Ambassador Bosworth sent 
numerous cables to Washington urging President Reagan to demand that Marcos not take 
any repressive action against citizens of the Philippines. In addition to this, Bosworth was 
tapping the radio traffic from Marcos forces and passing it to Enrile and Ramos.218 This 
gave Enrile and Ramos the opportunity to notify Cardinal Sin in enough time to mobilize 
the populace. Bosworth was a staunch supporter of pushing the Marcos regime out and 
tried for a number of years to convince the Reagan administration to do so. Bosworth was 
able to convince many members of the cabinet to include the Under Secretary of State, 
Michael Armacost, and the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Adm William 
Crowe.219 This support was guided by the intelligence that the U.S. Embassy was passing 
back to Washington detailing Marcos possible role in the assassination of Aquino and the 
human rights abuses that were taking place. 
Since the opposition movement’s main objective was a non-violent regime 
change, the tactical intelligence that mattered most was how to best protect the Coup 
participants and further de-legitimize the regime. The information that Bosworth passed 
to Enrile and Ramos about Marcos troop movement and initiatives was relayed through 
Radio Veritas, so that the protestors knew where to intercept pro-Marcos forces. The 
protestors were able to slow and prevent Marcos troops from being able to mobilize 
against the Coup. Additionally, President Reagan and the State Department were quietly 
urging Marcos to avoid any violent confrontation with Enrile and Ramos. Between 
February 22 and February 26, the Reagan administration finally agreed with Bosworth 
that Marcos had to go. Reagan offered to provide safety for Marcos if he were to leave 
the country peacefully and have Cory Aquino installed as President. Marcos reluctantly 
agreed and Bosworth then coordinated for Marcos departure on February 26.220 
                                                 




The opposition forces against Marcos were at a distinct disadvantage when it 
came to intelligence. They were able to overcome this hurdle by keeping the movement 
non-violent and using the intelligence that the U.S. Embassy provided to coordinate their 
protests and keep the population motivated to overthrow Marcos. Additionally, the 
intelligence that Ambassador Bosworth provided after 1983, helped gather enough 
internal U.S. support to push the Reagan administration into forcing Marcos out. 
3. Psychological 
The opposition leadership that advocated for the overthrow of Marcos was largely 
based in the U.S. Aquino lived in the U.S. for three years while organizing efforts to 
overthrow the regime. Additionally, numerous Filipino American groups staged protests 
against U.S. support of the Marcos regime and to induce U.S. administration support for 
their effort, these groups published many propaganda items to both rally the American 
people and force policy change. Underground newspapers and radio stations used these 
propaganda items within the Philippines to mobilize support.221 
In 1982, Marcos made his first state visit to the U.S. to meet with President 
Reagan. The visit gave the anti-Marcos opposition groups in the U.S. an opportunity to 
de-legitimize him and gain some support. The stated goal of the opposition during this 
visit was to “expose the abuses and excesses of the Marcos regime, embarrass the 
president in front of the U.S. government and the American people and by consequence 
call into question his political legitimacy.”222 The opposition set to achieve these goals 
by calling into question Marcos mental stability, his health and by relating him to 
historical villains.223 They then took these attributes and related them to current 
presidential policies and portrayed them as “eratic, irrational and dangerous.”224 
The Philippine News published the following statement as an example: 
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You can’t kill all of us. There will be some left to finish you!” … This is 
the enraged confirmation by the Philippine ruler Ferdinand E. Marcos that 
democratic revolutionary forces in the Philippines are pursuing in their 
destabilization program against his regime. …To counteract the bold plan 
of his enemies, Marcos announced that he has formed a secret police of 
some 1,000 plainclothes men to cover metro Manila.225 
This shows how the opposition wanted to paint Marcos in the American public as a 
dictator that was bent on holding onto his power at all costs. 
Inside the Philippines, the Church was often used as a place to print and make 
anti-Marcos propaganda for distribution. Signs were made that called the Marcos regime 
a dictatorship; leaflets were printed with damaging narratives, as well as underground 
newspapers. From the time that martial law was enacted in 1972, these newspapers were 
active.226 The newspapers focused on detailing the actions of the Marcos regime and also 
urging citizens to act in organized protests. The success of these newspapers was limited 
from 1972–1983, since Marcos had such a high degree of control over the media, but 
after the Aquino assassination the newspapers were a high demand item for the people. 
Radio Veritas was the Church owned radio station in the Philippines. It was 
highly censured once the Church began openly supporting the anti-Marcos movement. 
The radio station could not be completely stopped however, because Marcos understood 
that the Church had a wide band of popular support. Marcos attempted to censor the radio 
station as much as he could, but ultimately Radio Veritas was able to broadcast anti-
Marcos propaganda on occasion. The Church used this platform to call on protestors to 
remain non-violent and served as a coordination mechanism for many of the opposition 
organizations. The use of the radio station made it clear to listeners that they would not 
be alone in their efforts to protest against the regime. This gave many a sense of 
empowerment and helped enable such a large mass of people to protest. As mentioned 
earlier, after Aquino’s death, there were over 150 protests within a two-month span. This 
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high degree of opposition can be attributed to the support the movement got from Radio 
Veritas, which served as a powerful medium. 
4. Logistics 
Many organizations provided for the insurgency inside the Philippines. The 
Catholic Church provided a safe place for organizers to mobilize and coordinate their 
groups. The Church also was able to use their donation funds to keep the group 
resourced. UNIDO provided an outlet for the group to campaign against Marcos and 
more openly oppose him. The RAM also allowed for logistics to be funneled from the 
military to help support the protests. All of these groups assisted in ensuring that the 
revolutionary protests were well resourced. In addition to the internal groups, the U.S. 
also supported the movement by re-fueling Enrile and Ramos’ helicopters and ensured 
that mechanisms were in place to bring Marcos out of the Philippines.227 Diaspora groups 
within the U.S. also helped support the insurgency. Many Filipino American groups 
provided money to the insurgency in an effort to support the cause. Most of this money 
was spent in the production of the underground newspapers and different propaganda.  
It is difficult to track all of the money that was provided to the opposition to help 
with propaganda, campaign finance and materiel support because it came from so many 
different channels. Since the movement was non-violent, most of the funds were used to 
produce the propaganda and underground newspapers as well as keep the political group, 
UNIDO, active. The Church would urge parishioners to donate to the political nominees, 
such as Laurel and Aquino and use the Church funds to finance Radio Veritas and 
different propaganda items.  
RAM brought a significant amount of materiel support to the insurgency. When 
Ramos and Enrile defected, they brought their troops and equipment with them. Although 
they did not use it, the equipment was available as a contingency. The decision to keep 
the insurgency non-violent eliminated much of the need for excessive materiel support 
that is seen in many violent insurgencies. 
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D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS 
1. Commitment and Motivation 
The many groups that protested and lobbied against the Marcos regime showed a 
high level of commitment and motivation despite the regimes frequent attempts to 
dissuade them. After martial law was declared in 1972, Marcos jailed many of his 
opponents, but still through a jail cell, Aquino was able to sponsor movements like the 
LAFM and the A6LM. Laurel continued to campaign against the regime even though he 
knew that the elections in 1981 and 1985 would be rigged and fraudulently counted. The 
opposition continued their efforts, despite these occurrences, which shows a high level of 
commitment and motivation.  
Many of the opposition groups believed that without the U.S support, their efforts 
would never result in regime change. The groups continually tried to sway the 
administration’s support away from Marcos. In this sense, the opposition worked hard to 
undermine the legitimacy of the target regime. Although, the administration did not shift 
its support until the final protests and coup, many within the U.S. government expressed 
their support for the ouster of Marcos. This helped assure the opposition that the U.S. was 
wavering in their support for Marcos. At one point Ambassador Bosworth was upset that 
President Reagan was accusing both sides of fraud in the 1985 election and he told a 
crowd that “wasn’t the full U.S. position you heard. Be patient.”228  
The defections of Enrile and Ramos also helped motivate the protests. They were 
two high-ranking officials who denounced Marcos’s policy. This helped reaffirm the 
oppositions already held beliefs. RAM members showed a high level of commitment 
during the coup, at one point believing that death was inevitable, Enrile phoned Cardinal 
Sin stating that he was ready to die for his country if that is what needed to happen.229 
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2. Flexibility and Adaptability 
The opposition showed a high level of flexibility by shifting from violent to non-
violent tactics early on and by quickly mobilizing under the direction of the Church after 
the coup began. After Aquino was jailed in 1972, he was convinced that the only way 
Marcos could be removed was through force. In a sense, he was right as Marcos began 
making his first concessions after the A6LM bombing in 1980 by lifting martial law. The 
Church consistently took the stance that the regime change campaign should be non-
violent. Many members still supported the violent movements, but Cardinal Sin’s 
position and the official Church position was always non-violence. Aquino realized after 
the failures of LAFM and the cost of conducting a violent campaign with A6LM that 
non-violent protests could be more effective. Additionally, with the support of the 
church, the opposition movement could grow exponentially. By taking this stance, 
Aquino was able to unite the many disparate groups by not using the more risky violent 
tactics that they initially used. 
After the coup took place, the church was able to quickly mobilize its support to 
help the defectors. The protestors with local leaders were able to rapidly move people to 
prevent the slaughter of the RAM forces. By using Radio Veritas, the church was able to 
rapidly disseminate information and move its forces. This shows that the opposition used 
its flexibility to counter the regimes tactics and was agile enough to change its strategy 
when certain operations failed.  
The anti-Marcos opposition consistently showed its flexibility and adaptability by 
changing strategy, quickly countering regime actions and gaining popular support. The 
opposition leaders were able to coordinate their efforts and work well together to 
synchronize both messages and operations. The church, UNIDO, RAM and the business 
elites displayed this through a vast amount of disruption protests and their ability to 
garner international support. 
3. Tangible Support 
The opposition was able to get most of its manpower through existing 
organizations, such as the church and student organizations. It also sought to co-opt the 
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disenfranchised business elites who were dissatisfied with economic conditions and RAM 
military members. The ability of the political leaders like Aquino and Laurel to unite 
these groups was key to building the tangible support base needed to effect regime 
change. Materiel support was provided by many diaspora organizations in the U.S. as 
well as campaign contributions to UNIDO and donations to the Church. These all served 
to keep the protestors well resourced. 
The dissatisfaction with the regime was high and spanned across many social 
groups. The dissatisfaction created an environmental condition that was easy for the 
opposition to exploit. By co-opting already established protest groups, the opposition was 
able to build its base of support without having to spend a lot of time recruiting. Aquino 
had a huge base of support while he was in jail and in exile. He used his influence to 
garner support from these different groups and unite them under one political 
organization, UNIDO. UNIDO’s tangible support only grew when Aquino was martyred 
in 1983. 
The development of UNIDO gave all the opposition parties an outlet to more 
openly speak against the regime. Prior to 1981, Marcos could easily suppress any 
political efforts that spoke against him. Once the elections were boycotted, Marcos was 
forced to increase his legitimacy by allowing the existence of UNIDO. The opposition 
leaders that were exiled no longer needed a sanctuary to speak against the regime. The 
sanctuary aspect of tangible support was not needed in the Philippines after 1981, 
because UNIDO was allowed into the political system, even though they were prevented 
from winning any seats. 
E. ANALYSIS  
The target regime created a situation within the country that made it ripe for an 
insurgency. The economic disparity in the Philippines under Marcos disenfranchised too 
many segments of society. Surrounding countries, without economic international 
backing, were growing their GDP, while the Philippines was stagnating. This led the 
business elites to call for reforms in order to keep their businesses safe. The gap between 
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the rich and the poor was widening, which created political opportunities for opposition 
reformists to act.  
The many groups that opposed the target regime were representative of many 
segments of society. This allowed the opposition to co-opt all the different groups 
without having to spend time and resources to recruit. From 1972 on, the opposition was 
able to have a sizable portion of Marcos pillars of support.230 The opposition was able to 
co-opt the business elites, military and some government workers almost immediately. 
The use of the church to coordinate and mobilize support was a key aspect of the 
non-violent protests. The church, using intelligence provided by the U.S. Embassy was 
able to rapidly mobilize large groups of people to act in a coordinated fashion. This 
coordination and mobilization mechanism was key to putting enough pressure on the 
Marcos regime for the U.S. to shift support. Additionally, the church provided common 
ground for the organizations to come together and made it difficult for the target regime 
to counter. 
This insurgency was homegrown and was seen as an internally led organization, 
which gave it an immense amount of legitimacy among the people. Official external 
sponsorship of the insurgency did not come until the final few days, which prevented the 
insurgency from being seen as a puppet organization. The legitimacy of its leaders helped 
propel most of them to sitting congressional positions or presidencies. Cory Aquino and 
Fidel Ramos were both presidents of the Philippines while Juan Enrile still sits in the 
Philippine Congress today. Their actions were seen as brave and key to the overthrow of 
Marcos. U.S. external sponsorship was minimal, but it is still enough to consider this a 
case of UW. U.S. support provided the pressure needed to overthrow Marcos and prevent 
a violent clash between the target regime and protestors. 
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To effectively sponsor an insurgent movement, time and effort must be taken to 
understand both the target regime and the insurgent organization. This should serve as a 
starting point for strategy development and prioritization of LOE’s. The planning 
considerations of insurgent influence and target regime assessment outlined in this 
framework can help the planner determine what elements of the resistance can be 
augmented and offer potential fissures to exploit. The proposed LOE’s operationalize 
how to grow and advance the insurgency to achieve intermediate goals and contribute to 
the insurgent imperatives. The insurgent imperatives of commitment and motivation, 
flexibility and adaptability and tangible support were identified through a recent RAND 
study as common traits that successful COIN forces displayed.231 By examining the four 
case studies, these traits were also displayed by successful insurgencies. Continually 
assessing these imperatives can give the external sponsor the ability to ensure that the 
resistance is on the right path to success.  
The four case studies utilized a variety of different methods to achieve their goals. 
Lethal targeting dominated the Burma and Nicaragua cases with varying levels of 
success. The disruption operations conducted by DET 101 tied up a vast number of 
Japanese forces and aided in the growth of surrogate forces from 3,000 to 10,000 in less 
than two years.232 The disruption operations in Nicaragua had the opposite effect and 
alienated the insurgents from the population for the first five years of the insurgency. 
This forced a strategy shift where the Contras eventually reduced the negative impact of 
their operations on the populace resulting in a regime change.  This suggests that violence 
may be more useful when fighting against an external or occupying force in a resistance 
rather than against an internal organic government or adversary. 
Non-violent tactics were used in the Solidarity case and the Philippine revolution 
to achieve regime change. These two organizations were able to effectively co-opt 
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numerous anti-regime groups and unite them to force regime change. Additionally, both 
groups effectively used target regime actions to induce popular support for the resistance. 
Whether using violent or non-violent tactics, all four cases show how an external sponsor 
can support the resistance by following the proposed framework. This chapter will 
outline the common characteristics that enabled success throughout the four case studies.  
A. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Insurgent Influence 
The insurgent movement must have the organizational capacity to be able to 
accept external support.233 This includes the ability to accept new recruits into their 
network, the ability to move supplies and the ability to effectively coordinate among 
networks or cells. The insurgent movement cannot grow too quickly or the command 
structure can be overwhelmed and lose control. In the Contra case, the resistance was too 
immature and proper assessments were not done on the leaders before external support 
was given. This led to misuse of the sponsor’s support and money. In the Burma case, the 
insurgent organization had the capacity to grow as a result of external sponsor efforts and 
leadership.  
External support of the insurgency cannot overtake the indigenous organization. 
Efforts must be made by the external sponsor to keep their support as clandestine as 
possible. This serves to further legitimize the insurgency and reduce perceptions of a U.S. 
puppet resistance. When external support is well known, the sponsor becomes 
accountable for all insurgent actions, both good and bad. When in fact, “the external 
sponsor cannot control most of the causal factors leading to end state.”234 Keeping the 
support clandestine can reduce the stigma associated with such groups as the Contras 
during their repeated instances of human rights abuses.  
                                                 
233 In “Social Movements and Networks,” Ch-3 by Helmut Anheier, the rise of the Nazi Movement is 
examined and he concludes that a significant organizational development occurred before the party began 
rising in influence. Anheier, Helmut. “Social Movements and Networks,” in Social Movements and 
Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51.  
234 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 73. 
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A resonating narrative is an important aspect of insurgent networking. The 
narrative should be broad based and appeal to a wide swath of the population. It should 
effectively condemn or vilify the target regime and offer a prognostic solution to the 
problem.235 The Solidarity narrative used these aspects to gain support for their cause. 
Solidarity focused their narrative on Polish nationalism, which was extremely important 
to the population. Even though the resistance wanted a democracy, they understood that 
many Polish people still believed in socialism, so they steered away from a specific form 
of government and focused on the negative features of the target regime. Additionally, 
they adapted their narrative as conditions changed, tailoring it to uncovered regime 
atrocities and new public sentiment. 
Co-opting existing organizations is an effective way to rapidly gain a large 
amount of support and mechanisms for aiding the resistance organization.236 This method 
of bloc recruitment helps the organization appeal to large swaths of the population who 
are sympathetic to not only the insurgents’ plight, but the co-opted organization as well. 
This was used extensively in all the cases. Solidarity spent nearly 10 years gaining the 
support and trust of many different groups that the target regime trusted and advocated 
for. By co-opting the workers and trade unions that the government supported, Solidarity 
was able to effectively subvert the regime and recruit new members. In Burma, DET 101 
used existing military forces under British control to augment and help recruit their 
guerrilla force. This led to the recruitment of the Kachin people and the securing of a 
sanctuary inside Burma.  
Penetration of the target regimes’ pillars of support can also increase insurgent 
influence. The pillars of support include: military, police, business elites, government 
bureaucrats, politicians and media.237 Penetration of these pillars can allow the insurgents 
to integrate them into the resistance organization and facilitate a more peaceful turnover 
of power once regime change is affected. Of the case studies, this was most prevalent in 
                                                 
235 The three elements that make up a narrative were identified as diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational. This was derived from an Unconventional Warfare seminar delivered by Professor Doowan 
Lee, at the Naval Postgraduate School on November 15, 2013. 
236 Anheier, “Social Movements.”  
237 Helvey, On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict, 9-19. 
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the Philippine revolution, where military, politicians, business elites and the media were 
all advocating for the overthrow of Marcos. In countries where diverse segments and 
traditional pillars of support are all looking for change, external sponsorship should be 
heavily considered if insurgent and sponsor goals align. 
2. Target Regime 
Identifying both the strengths and weaknesses of the target regime is important 
during the assessment phase. This cannot be done effectively in a condensed timeframe. 
Pre-conflict stages should focus on accurate and complete assessments of the target 
regime. This should include identifying the actions that make the police or security forces 
overreact and the level of commitment by regional and local powerbrokers. Identifying 
the actions that make the security forces overreact gives the insurgent organization the 
knowledge to plan future events to induce recruitment and support for their organization 
while undermining the regime.238  
Decision points, sequels and branches must be developed during pre-UW stages 
to exploit the regime when they are most vulnerable. This should include the use of 
media to garner both internal and international support if the regime commits atrocities. 
Additionally, tactical level contingencies should be considered such as: what should the 
organization do, when its people are jailed? Or how should we respond to overwhelming 
police or military force? Identifying the responses to these scenarios and putting 
mechanisms in place for timely execution gives the insurgents assurance that actions will 
be taken on their behalf if they get hurt or jailed thus lowering the risk to support.  
Identifying the people who have a high commitment to the regime and those who 
have a low commitment to the regime can assist the insurgent organization in identifying 
whom to target for subversion and what to target for sabotage. Personnel with a high 
commitment are unlikely to be phased by psychological measures and may be better 
targeted for sabotage. Those with a wavering sense of loyalty or people who show 
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sympathy to the insurgent cause may be able to be co-opted for future use.239 In any 
event, this takes time. A persistent presence in vulnerable countries or regions where 
regime change is probable will assist planners in getting a fuller picture of the problem. 
Persistent presence will help to foment the relationships needed to build an 
effective organization and develop the knowledge needed to counter the target regime. 
Persistent presence in target locations will help to ensure the successful integration of the 
external sponsor and a better understanding by planners how to best support the insurgent 
organization. The relationships formed during the pre-UW phases can greatly enhance the 
sponsor’s knowledge base and ensure that mechanisms are in place prior to official 
sponsorship. 
B. LINES OF EFFORT 
The integration of these broadly framed LOEs will help military planners develop 
successful regime change campaigns. Understanding when and how to use the different 
LOE’s will be situation dependent. The uniqueness of the target regime and the capacity 
of the insurgency should help the planner determine how to best prioritize the LOE’s. 
1. Disruption 
Sabotage and subversion should be used on a persistent basis during a UW 
campaign to continuously attrite the target regime of support. This can be done in 
numerous ways. In Poland, nationalist and religious sentiments were promulgated 
through the use of symbols and strikes. In the Philippines, underground newspapers and 
flyers were used along with protests. In Burma and Nicaragua, attrition came through 
lethal targeting of both officials and government offices. Disruption operations must 
display the capabilities of the resistance and the ineptness of the target regime.  
Kinetic disruption operations can often be counter-productive for the insurgent 
organization.240 Determining when to use violence must be based on the insurgent 
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organizations’ ability to handle the regime response and how the population will be 
affected. Using violence too early for the Peoples Power movement resulted in very little 
popular support and a harsh regime reaction that jailed a large portion of the LAFM and 
A6LM forces. The insurgency should be very careful with the use of violence to not 
incite regime crackdowns or impose penalties on the population. 
Any force the insurgents use must be viewed as more legitimate than that of the 
target regime.241 It is important for the population to feel as if the insurgent group is a 
better alternative to the current regime. In Nicaragua, the Contras made the mistake of 
directing their operations against the regime and the population. This resulted in de-
legitimizing the insurgents and alienating them from the population. Non-violent protests 
are potentially incredibly effective. When the target regime reacts violently to these 
protests out of frustration, the population perceives it as unnecessary oppression. When 
force is used, it must be strictly aimed against the target regime and have little effect on 
the lives of the population.  
2. Intelligence  
Intelligence operations are vital to regime change campaigns to protect the 
insurgent force and develop methods to disaggregate the target regime. When engaging in 
kinetic and violent acts it is important to know how the regime will react and the methods 
they will use to find the perpetrators. This intelligence can then be used to maximize 
recruitment and propaganda efforts. Understanding the target population and local 
sentiments will drive the disruption and psychological LOEs. Intelligence must be used 
persistently throughout the UW campaign to focus tactical operations and strategy.  
In Poland, during the martial law period, there was a high degree of control over 
the population. Intelligence operations focused mostly on future regime actions to protect 
the underground printing and propaganda operations. Knowledge of regime actions from 
internal sources or assets can be extremely beneficial in protecting the insurgent force. 
Using the intelligence LOE as a primary means for maintaining and developing 
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the reverse is also true. Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 169. 
 109 
operational security is paramount. Intelligence networks can be used to feed the regime 
disinformation on the intentions of the insurgents.242 
An early presence in the target country should be a pre-requisite for a UW 
campaign to develop intelligence networks. The external sponsor can gain valuable 
insight into the target regime and the insurgent organization to better craft future plans to 
ensure success.  
Additionally, the insurgent’s intelligence gathering capability must be developed. 
Paul et al. explains that COIN forces should develop intelligence mechanisms to support 
kill/capture missions.243 This suggests that the insurgents must develop internal 
intelligence sources to protect themselves and stay ahead of the regime. Enabling the 
insurgents to gather both tactical and psychological intelligence puts the external sponsor 
at less risk and lowers their signature. The insurgents are better suited to gather this 
intelligence because they have both access and placement within the target country and 
are likely to get more reliable information from the populace. This was evident in the 
Burma campaign. Once a substantial base of support is developed insurgents should be 
trusted to provide local intelligence for the organization and sponsors. 
3. Psychological 
Psychological operations are important to incorporate into any UW campaign to 
gain popular and international support. The use of propaganda and narratives can aid the 
insurgent organization in growth and motivation. The psychological LOE can be 
exploited through the media, leaflets, radio and underground newspapers, or through any 
means that can reach large portions of the population. The psychological aspect must be 
able to tap into deeply rooted beliefs, traditions or culture to have great effect.  
Psychological propaganda should be developed in concert with the resistance 
organization. It is extremely difficult for someone outside the target countries to 
understand what will resonate with the local population. In Burma, the psychological 
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propaganda employed did not have much of an effect on the local population because the 
Psychological operations messages that were printed on the Japanese currency were not 
widely read. Much of the population utilized opium or other goods for currency. In 
Poland, the narrative used for psychological propaganda was extremely effective because 
it invoked a high sense of nationalism and history of Polish resistance. In both cases, the 
employment of psychological propaganda required a high degree of knowledge of local 
customs and traditions. This knowledge can be developed through persistent presence 
operations in target countries and with strong local and regional partnerships. 
The target audience and political goal must be identified prior to beginning any 
psychological effort. One form of media may be effective to use against neutral elements, 
but may not be effective when used against enemy elements.244 The message and means 
of delivery must be tailored to the audience and resonate with the particular target. 
Understanding the target country specifics such as literacy levels, media footprints and 
dominant forms of communication can help in developing the dissemination strategy.  
4. Logistics 
The external sponsor should utilize insurgent mechanisms for logistics when 
possible. This serves to build the insurgents organizational capacity and lower the 
external sponsor’s visibility. This was perhaps most prevalent in Poland, where the U.S. 
provided the insurgents with money and equipment through a very disparate logistics 
network in a heavily controlled country during the martial law period. The external 
sponsor had to use existing mechanisms to get Solidarity equipment and money because 
building a new infrastructure would have been too risky and time consuming. Utilizing 
existing networks that have organic, natural concealment from the target regime to 
support logistics operations is useful.  Organic concealment means utilizing existing 
networks that are risky for the target regime to penetrate or oppress. A good example of 
this is the RAM in the Philippines and the trade unions in Poland. Both of these  
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organizations were politically sensitive to the target regime and oppressing these 
organizations would have resulted in second and third order effects that the regime was 
not willing to endure.  
The external sponsor must be careful to not give the insurgent organization more 
material support then they can properly handle or distribute.245 In Nicaragua, the U.S. 
inundated the insurgent organization with arms, money and materials. This led to mis-
management of the goods within the Contra organization. As a result, the U.S. was forced 
to control money distribution and spending, thus increasing their visibility and risk. As 
the insurgent organization grows in capability and capacity, logistics assistance can 
increase. 
The use of a sanctuary greatly increases the insurgent chance for success.246 This 
can help lower both the insurgent and external sponsor risk levels. Having a sanctuary 
provides both elements an outlet to more effectively coordinate, plan and distribute 
logistics. Additionally, a safe haven helps increase the capabilities of the insurgent 
organization as it provides a venue for training. In Burma and Nicaragua, safe havens 
were utilized and provided both insurgencies with a training venue and mechanism for 
logistics support. 
C. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES: 
1. Commitment and Motivation 
The commitment and motivation of the insurgents is a critical factor to their 
success. This is enabled by the LOEs mentioned above and serves to prevent penetration 
by the regime and increases insurgent legitimacy. If the insurgent organization is 
perceived as corrupt then popular support will wane. It will be difficult for a corrupt 
insurgent organization to recruit because they will not be seen as a viable political 
alternative to the regime. 
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Emphasizing the need for commitment and motivation throughout the insurgent 
organization will assist in raising their legitimacy and recruitment. Additionally, it helps 
protect the insurgent organization from regime penetration and targeting. Committed and 
motivated groups will practice better operational security then forces that are looking to 
enhance their personal wealth or status. Solidarity was able to remain clandestine 
throughout the martial law period despite incredibly high membership. This is because 
the individuals and leadership were committed and motivated to advance the insurgent 
cause and did not seek to advance their personal wealth or status. 
2. Flexibility and Adaptability  
Displaying flexibility and adaptability keeps the regime in a reactive mode and 
increases the chance that the regime will act in a repressive fashion. When the state acts 
in a heavy handed manner, the insurgency has the opportunity to exacerbate social 
fissures and exploit the action to gain support. The target regime will generally have the 
force advantage and superior technology to target the insurgent efforts. The insurgent 
organization should be more flexible because it is smaller and should not have the 
bureaucratic barriers that the regime has. Flexibility must be used and displayed to win. 
Solidarity displayed their flexibility by exploiting regime oppression to gain 
concessions. Solidarity was able to get a monument built and union demands met in both 
1970 and 1980. The Peoples Power revolution showed their flexibility by exploiting 
Marcos corruption through the organization of protests after Aquino’s death. Peoples 
Power used Aquino’s death to rally hundreds of thousands of protestors to show their 
disaffection to the regime. 
3. Tangible Support 
Increasing the manpower, intelligence, sanctuary, material, funding and 
promoting tolerance of the insurgent organization are all aspects of tangible support.247 
These should be the goals of the insurgent organization and the external sponsor during  
 
                                                 
247 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 182. 
 113 
the latent and incipient phase of the insurgency. Building substantial tangible support is 
necessary to effectively execute the LOE’s and reduce the risk to the insurgent 
organization. 
Tangible support was extremely high in the Nicaragua case, but the insurgency 
still faltered in the early years because the external sponsor primarily provided it. The 
insurgent group must have the capacity to build its own tangible support. The external 
sponsor must be able to augment the insurgency and fill the capabilities gaps. It is 
possible that the Contras failed initially, because they began executing their disruption 
operations well before their internal tangible support base was adequately developed. 
Notably, Paul et al. explains that outcomes are “less certain when insurgents’ tangible 
support does not come from the population.”248 
The case studies serve to show how the proposed planning framework for UW 
regime change campaigns may be used. This framework is meant to serve as a starting 
point for operational level staffs who may be asked to develop plans for UW campaigns. 
The framework can be used to develop an initial plan and identifies the key elements that 
have made past insurgencies successful. Understanding the target regime and level of 
insurgent influence are necessary before contemplating UW. The LOE’s should be based 
on the target regime and insurgent influence assessments. Successful regime change 
through a UW campaign is possible. Identifying the movements that align with U.S. 
interests is a military priority.  
This thesis used four case studies to test the proposed framework as a starting 
point for operational staffs to plan UW campaigns. The framework is not meant to be a 
rigid solution as every insurgent organization and target regime is unique. However, there 
are common threads that exist in all the successful insurgencies and these commonalities 
should be used to inform future efforts. 
 
                                                 
248 Paul et al., Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 72. 
 114 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 115 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Agee, Ryan, and Maurice Duclos. “Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for 
Unconventional Warfare.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
Astor, Gerald. The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders and Madmen in the China-
Burma-India Theater of World War II. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004. 
Bernstein, Carl. “Cover Story: The Holy Alliance.” Accessed December 2, 2013. 
http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_holy_alliance.php 
Burkett, Randy. “An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to 
RASCLS.” Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 7–17.  
Brown College. “Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs.” Accessed January 7, 2014. 
http://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/n-
contrasus.php.  
Cengage Learning. “The Twenty One Demands: A Call for Workers Rights and Freedom 
in a Socialist State.” Accessed November 25, 2013. 
http://college.cengage.com/history/west/resources/students/primary/solidarity.htm 
Centre for Public Opinion Research (Poland). “Cannonisation of Pope John Paul II.” 
Accessed December 14, 2013. http://www.cbos.pl/EN/home_en/cbos_en.php 
Central Intelligence Agency. “Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski.” Accessed December 12, 
2013. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-
featured-story-archive/colonel-ryszard-kuklinski.html 
Central Intelligence Agency. “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.” 
September 22, 1993. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm. 
Central Intelligence Agency. Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly 
Government. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1970. 
Connable, Ben, and Martin Libicki. How Insurgencies End. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2010. 
Cull, Nicholas, David Holbrook, and David Welch. Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A 
Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 
2003.  
Department of Defense. Unconventional Warfare Operations (FM 3-05-201).  
Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003.  
 116 
Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0). Washington 
DC: Department of Defense, 2011.  
Department of the Army. Special Operations (Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05). 
Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2012.  
Dobbs, Michael, K. S. Karol, and Dessa Trevisan. Poland: Solidarity: Walesa. New 
York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981. 
Fenn, Charles. At The Dragons Gate: With the OSS In the Far East. Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2004. 
Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and 
How they Won the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 
Government, United States. National Security Strategy. Washington DC: The White 
House, 2010. 
Helvey, Robert. On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals. 
Boston MA: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2004. 
Heritiage Foundation. “War on Human Rights.” Accessed January 8, 2014. 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1983/07/the-sandinista-war-on-human-
rights.  




Karnow, Stanley. “Setting Marcos Adrift.” New York Times, March 19, 1989. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/19/magazine/reagan-and-the-philippines-
setting-marcos-adrift.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1  
Kennedy, Michael D. Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical 
Sociology of Soviet Type Sociology. New York: University Press of Cambridge, 
1991.  
Kinzer, Stephen. Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. 
New York: Times Books, 2006. 
Klerlein, Ellie. “ICE Case Studies (Inventory of Casualties and Environment).” Accessed 
February 11, 2014. http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/nicaragua.htm. 
Kubick, Jan. The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity 
and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. University Park, PA. The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1994. 
 117 
Kushida, Kenji. “The Political Economy of the Philippines Under Marcos: Property 
Rights in the Philippines from 1965–1986.” Stanford Journal of East Asian 
Studies (Stanford) 3, no. 1 (2003). 
Laba, Roman. The Roots of Solidarity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1991.  
“Pro Solidarity Propaganda Show Gets Lukewarm Reception.” Lewiston Journal News. 
February 1, 1982. 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1899&dat=19820201&id=swcgAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=BmUFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3605,92967.  
LIBCOM.org. “1970-71 Uprising in Poland.” Accessed March 25, 2014. 
https://libcom.org/history/1970-71-uprising-poland. 
Library, of Congress. “From Aquinos Assassination to Peoples Power.” Accessed March 
25, 2014. http://countrystudies.us/philippines/29.htm. 
Malay, Caroline S. “Heroes of Press, Freedom and the Underground Press in the Time of 
Marcos.” Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility. December 27, 2006. 
http://www.cmfr-phil.org/2006/12/27/heroes-of-press-freedom-the-underground-
press-in-the-time-of-marcos/. 
McAdam, Doug and Diani, Mario. Social Movements and Networks: Relational 
Approaches to Collective Action. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
McCallus, Joseph P. “The Celebration of The Devil: Degredation Rhetoric in the 
Propaganda of the Anti-Marcos Movement in America.” Philippine Quarterly of 
Culture and Society 17, no. 1 (March 1989): 90–103. 
Mercado, Monina Allarey. People Power: The Greatest Democracy Ever Told. Manila: 
The James B. Reuter, S. J. Foundation, 1986. 
Moon, Tom. This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert 
Operations in World War II. Los Angeles, CA: Burning Gate Press, 1991. 
Nemenzo, Gemma. Positively Fillipino. February 20, 2013. 
http://positivelyfilipino.com/magazine/2013/2/77-hours-the-behind-the-scenes-at-
the-1986-edsa-people-power-revolution. 
Noonan, Peggy. “We Want God.” Wall Street Journal. April 7, 2005. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122479408458463941. 
Parry, Robert. “How Reagans Propaganda Succeeded.” March 08, 2010. 
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/030810.html. 
Paul, Christoper, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 
 118 
Paul, Christoper, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers. New 
York: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 19 July 2010 
Petit, Brian. Going Big by Getting Small: Operational Art by Special Operations in 
Phase Zero. Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013. 
Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From 
World War II Through the Persian Gulf. Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996. 
Ronfeldt, David, and Brian Jenkins. The Nicaraguan Resistance and U.S. Policy: Report 
on a May 1987 Conference. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987. 
Schultz, George. “Turmoil and Triumph: The George Schultz Years.” Accessed March 4, 
2014. http://www.turmoilandtriumph.org/reaganyears/marcos_v_aquino.php  
Selth, Andrew. “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945.” Modern Asian Studies 20, 
no. 3 (1986): 483–507. 
Thompson, Mark R. The Anti-Marcos Struggle. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1995. 
UK Essays. “Covert Support to Solidarity.” Accessed November 29, 2013. 
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/covert-support-to-solidarity-in-poland-
history-essay.php.  
University of Texas. “Nicaraguan Contras and the United States.” Accessed January 30, 
2014. http://ows.edb.utexas.edu/site/smith-redfield/nicaragua. 
U.S. Army. “Ch-5: History of Special Operations in the China-India-Burma Theater.” 
Accessed October 17, 2013. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-
425.html. 
Waller, Douglas. Wild Bill Donovan. New York: Free Press, 2011. 
Walsh, Lawrence E. Iran Contra: The Final Report. Washington DC: Times Books, 
1995. 
Ward, James R. “Detachment 101: The American Kachin Rangers.” Accessed October 
15, 2013. http://www.oss-101.com/history.html. 
Weiser, Benjamin. A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission and the Price 




“WWII Allied Propaganda Banknotes.” Accessed October 10, 2013, 
http://www.psywarrior.com/WWIIAlliedBanknotes.html. 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 121 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
